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INTRODUCTION
Theologians reflect on the relationship between
God and man.

Because of the Christian conception of God,

Christian theology is dependent on, and requires some theory
about,

God's self-revelation.

Different Christian theolo-

gians in different eras have explored different aspects of
man's existence as means through which God reveals himself.
Such sources of knowledge include Scripture, history, reason,

and experience.

Different theologians also employ

different techniques in reflecting on revelation.
to understand a specific theologian,

In order

we must know what he

uses as his source of revealed information, and understand
how he uses that source.

Within this context, we will be

able to understand his theological positions in their fullest sense.
come from,

We will be able to tell where these positions
what they mean in themselves, and what implica-

tions they have.
When the Fathers of the early Christian Church did
theology,

they used Scripture as their primary source for

God's revelation.

Biblical interpretation was the body and

bones of their theology.

The techniques which they used to

interpret Scripture incorporated various philosophical positions,

which therefore influenced their theological under-

standing; but the primary focus of their theological reflection was the text of Scripture.
1
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Origen has been identified as the first Christian
"theologian," with the implication that he is the first to
have moved beyond Biblical interpretation to speculative
theology.

But in his own writings, Origen makes no distinc-

tion between these two functions.
cally by interpreting Scripture.

Origen reflects theologiThe correct interpretation

of Scripture produces sound theological speculation.
Origen's particular exegetical technique, allegory,
allows him to engage in extensive speculation.

Allegory

assumes that the text means more than the words themselves
are able to directly communicate.

But as Origen develops

his allegorical method, we see that he is not free to import whatever meaning he desires into the text.

For Origen,

allegory is not primarily a means of deriving relevant information from a recalcitrant text.

If this were the case,

Origen's criteria for relevancy would be the guiding principles of his interpretation.

Rather, Origen believes allego-

ry is the way to allow Scripture to interpret itself.
text of Scripture is not obscure and recalcitrant;
mysteriously relevatory.

The
it is

Scripture is the specific means

which God has chosen to reveal himself to man.

By allowing

Scripture to reveal its mysteries--and for Origen this means
by pursuing allegorical interpretations--the theologian is
able to reflect on God's self-revelation.
Since Origen does theology through scriptural interpretation, an examination of a specific theological doctrine
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depends on an understanding of Origen•s interpretation of
the texts in which he finds this doctrine.

Since the alle-

gorical technique presupposes a vast interconnection of
scriptural texts,

and interprets these texts in the light

of each other, developing such an understanding of Origen•s
interpretations is a formidable task.

The best approach

for studying Origen•s theology is a close examination of his
interpretations of specific texts as he uses these texts to
develop a specific theological position.
This thesis is an examination of Origen•s interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9--the two biblical accounts of the creation of man--in order to better understand Origen•s theological anthropology,

and the soterio-

logical element of Origen's incarnational theology.

Origen

uses these texts to develop his description of the human
condition.
When early Christian writers discuss the human condition, the subject of the human problem is necessarily included.

For the early Church, man's existence is obviously

flawed,

especially in regards to man's relationship with

God.

Any discussion of the human condition involves a dis-

cussion of what is wrong with the human condition.

When

early Christian theologians discuss theological anthropology, they are engaged in diagnosing the problem which is inherent in man's existence, due to man's culpable action.
Such a diagnosis sets the stage for presenting a

4

cure.

Origen and other early Christian writers analyze the

problem inherent in man's current existence from a perspective which presupposes the Christian solution to this problem:

the life,

death,

and resurrection of Jesus Christ.

Therefore, any discussion of Origen's theological anthropology will lead to an examination of Origen's soteriology.
When Origen uses his interpretations of Gen 1:26-30
and Gen 2:4-9 to develop his theological anthropology, he
draws on a tradition of interpretation which has been heavily influenced by Philo of Alexandria.

Philo's interpreta-

tions of these verses examine the role of the Logos in the
creation of man,
man.

and in the relationship between God and

Therefore, we might expect that Origen's Logos theolo-

gy has been heavily influenced by Philo's Logos theology.
Origen's

interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen

2:4-9 are crucial to his theological anthropology.

But

Origen draws on Philo's interpretations of these passages
in his own work.

Philo writes from a non-Christian perspec-

tive, and therefore his interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and
Gen 2:4-9 and his theological anthropology do not correspond
to a Christian belief in the saving activity of Christ's
life,

death and resurrection.

Since Origen uses Philo's

interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9 to develop his
own theological anthropology, we might expect Origen's theological anthropology to lack an intrinsic correspondence
to Christian soteriology.

We might expect Origen's theo-
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logical anthropology to presuppose a "Philonic'' soteriology.
Origen may describe the problem inherent in man's current
existence in such a way that Philo's marriage of Judaism and
Middle Platonism is the implied solution.
By examining Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-30
and Gen 2:4-9 and the theological anthropology which he
develops through these interpretations we discover that this
is not the case.

Origen's use of Philonic interpretations

in his own work does not lead him to neglect the implica-

tions of Christian soteriology.

On the contrary, Origen

adapts Philo's interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9
to emphasize the soteriological aspect of the Incarnation of
the Logos--even though the concept of the Incarnation is
alien to Philo's perspective.

Thus, Origen uses non-Christ-

ian elements to develop a distinctively Christian theological anthropology:

an understanding of the defect in man's

existence which requires the Incarnation of the Logos as
Jesus Christ as its resolution.
This thesis proposes to establish the contention
that Origen's theological anthropology, as he develops it
through his interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9,
involves specific reference to the Incarnation as a necessary component in the saving work of the Logos.

In order to

establish this contention, Origen's interpretations of Gen
1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9 must be carefully examined.

Such an

examination requires a thorough understanding of Origen's

6

exegetical method and general treatment of Scripture.

The

first chapter of this thesis will attempt to provide such an
understanding of Origen's use of the allegorical method.
The second chapter will use this understanding of
Origen's exegetical technique to examine his interpretations
of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9.

Origen tends to neglect Gen

2:4-9 in favor of Gen 1:26-30;

therefore, Origen's first

Homily on Genesis, the most comprehensive interpretation of
Gen 1:26-30 in his surviving works, will be the foundation
for this examination.

The concepts and issues which Origen

derives from Gen 1:26-30 in this homily will be the foci for
our examination of all other interpretations of Gen 1:26-30
and Gen 2:4-9 which occur in Origen's writings.
Since Origen does not develop these interpretations
in a vacuum, we must explore the various influences on, and
sources of, Origen's work if we are to adequately understand
this work.

Chapter Three will consist of an_exploration of

the two most probable influences on Origen's interpretations
of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9:
Philo of Alexandria.

Clement of Alexandria and

By comparing the interpretations of

the authors with Origen's, we will be able to highlight
specific characteristics of Origen's interpretations and
discover the implications and assumptions of these interpretations.
have a

At the end of these three chapters, we should

thorough understanding of the content and implica-

tions of Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen
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2:4-9.
The last chapter of this thesis will correlate the
theological anthropology which Origen develops in these
interpretations with the soteriological "solutions" which
this anthropology presupposes.

Our task is simplified since

Origen sometimes makes this correlation himself.

Origen

sometimes uses his interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen
2:4-9 to explicitly present aspects of his understanding of
the saving work of Christ.

In other cases, Origen's soteri-

ology is only implicitly present through his theological
anthropology.

By examining the explicit and implicit soter-

iological aspects of Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-30
and Gen 2:4-9, we will be able to see how Origen develops an
understanding of the human problem which requires the Incarnation of the Logos as its solution.

CHAPTER I
ORIGEN'S EXEGETICAL METHOD
Before examining the specific interpretation which
Origen gives to the creation of man stories in Genesis, we
must examine his general understanding of the character of
Scripture and its interpretation.

This examination will

include an analysis of what Origen thinks Scripture is, what
purpose Scripture has and how it achieves this purpose.
Secondly, Origen's conception of the three levels of meaning within Scripture will be explored, as a principle which
governs his exegetical method.

Finally, since the methods

of interpretation which Origen uses are based upon this
understanding of Scripture, an examination of these techniques will follow this analysis.

I.

The Nature and Purpose of Scripture
When Origen deals with Scripture, he is dealing

for the most part with the Bible used by modern believers:
the books which Origen considered canonical are roughly
the books included in the modern Catholic canon.l

Origen

considers the Septuagint the authoritative text for the
Old Testament, even where it differs from the Hebrew text,
since he maintains the tradition of the divine inspiration
of this translation.2

Nevertheless, Origen is sensitive
8
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to the possibility that some Septuagint texts have been corrupted in their transmission, and therefore uses the Hebrew
text and other Greek translations to establish the proper
version of the Septuagint text.3

While Origen considers the

Septuagint to be the divinely inspired Scripture of the
Christian faith,

he is sensitive to the textual problems

arising from the transmission of this text.
In considering Scripture as divinely inspired,
Origen maintains that Scripture carries God's power and
authority.

The content of Scripture is essentially divine

truth, truth revealed by God and therefore supremely trustworthy.

In the final analysis, Origen considers Scripture

to be the only consistently reliable source of information
regarding God's teaching available to mankind.4
Scripture must be a reliable source of God's teaching, since Scripture's function is to reveal the truth about

God.

By communicating these truths, Scripture leads man

to God.

Thus,

Scripture contains all of the doctrines of

Christian faith, and all of the truths about God which human
language is capable of conveying.
language is a limitation.

The frailty of human

Sometimes the truths are communi-

cated in fragmentary or shadowy fashion,

but such is the

"sacramental mystery" of this life as a whole.

What man

can apprehend in his present state is only a "copy" of the
perfect comprehension which is possible to the purified,
perfect soul.

But the "copy" which we are able to compre-
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hend can still lead us to the higher truths by training our
"spiritual intelligence."5

Thus, Scripture acts as a figure

of the eternal truth, and therefore as a path to the eternal
truth.6

The possession of perfect truth is itself union

with God,

so Scripture is primarily God's instrument for

leading mankind to this union.

Since this truth is essen-

tially "spiritual," Scripture is intended to convey to humanity information about, and the requirements of, the spiritual life.?

Although Scripture, the pathway to perfection,

may be accepted and employed by a community of believers,
the emphasis of this type of understanding of Scripture,
God,

and perfection tends

individual soul.

to be on the efforts of the

While Origen is committed to the Church,

his fundamental bias is towards exploring the character and
duties of the individual's spiritual life, and his interpretation of Scripture reflects this bias.B
But while Origen considers the content of Scripture
to be eminently trustworthy,

he qualifies the confidence

with which he approaches Scripture with three codicils.
First, Origen considers Scripture to be a unified, inspired
text which God has given to his Church to lead its members
to unity with him.

Thus the contents of Scripture must be

understood in light of the whole of Scripture, and the purpose for which Scripture has been given.

This principle

of totality leads Origen to assert that individual passages
of Scripture must be interpreted in a manner consistent with
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the rest of Scripture, and with the purpose of Scripture, in
order to be trustworthy.

Therefore, passages of Scripture

which seem to assert something which is inconsistent with
the rest of Scripture, or which do not contribute to leading mankind towards unity with God, such passages must be
understood in a non-literal fashion if their divinely inspired content is to be received.9
The principle that Scripture must be treated as a
coherent whole governs Origen's understanding of the relationship between the Old Testament and the New Testament.
Some modern authors have suggested that Origen understands
the New Testament as superceding the Old, in the sense that
the New Testament has made the Old Testament obsolete.10
Origen's use of New Testament interpretations of the older
scriptures may have contributed to this theory.

The Old

Testament must be understood in the light of the New Testament,

whose message moves beyond the preliminary stages

which the Old Testament scriptures provided.

But Origen's

attitude toward the Old Testament is more positive:

the

Old Testament scriptures form a unity with the New Testament.

The Old Testament must be interpreted in the light

of the New Testament because the New Testament reveals the
true meaning of the Old, which is essentially the Christian
Gospel.

Thus, rather than superceding it, the New Testament

allows the Old Testament to come into its own;
meaning of the Old Testament is,

the true

and was intended to be,
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Christian.ll

The interpretation of any passage of Scripture

must be consistent with the correct, i.e., Christian interpretation of the rest of Scripture.

Such a proper interpre-

tation of an Old Testament passage may indicate the correct
interpretation of a passage from the New Testament.
fore,

There-

the trustworthy character of Scripture depends upon

the correct interpretation of Scripture, which can only be
determined when Scripture is treated as a

11

Seamless gar-

ment ...
The second qualification which Origen makes to the
trustworthiness of Scripture is that Scripture must be interpreted properly in order to be trusted.

This correct

interpretation is itself dependent upon divine inspiration.
The true meaning of Scripture, the divinely inspired and
trustworthy content of Scripture, is only available to those
who have been inspired by the grace of God.

This inspira-

tion belongs to all Christians due to the grace which they
received at baptism, so all Christians have some idea of
the true meaning of Scripture.l2

But the inspiration to

more deeply comprehend the meaning of Scripture is a special
charism,

theoretically available to all Christians,

but

actually bestowed only upon those who are capable of understanding (and thus profitting from)
Scripture.l3

the deeper meaning of

This deeper meaning is the content which God

primarily intends the Scripture to convey, and so is also
the meaning intended by the inspired author of the text.

13

While Origen asserts that the inspired character of Scripture is thus directly related to the intended meaning of
the author,

he also maintains that this meaning is not

available to the reader without divine inspiration leading
to the correct, spiritual understanding of the text.14
The third qualification which Origen makes regarding
the trustworthiness of Scripture is that, while Scripture
is,

as a whole,

the only reliable source of God's teaching

generally available to humanity,

it is nevertheless incom-

plete; human language is incapable of expressing all of the
mysteries of God.

Thus, the truth communicated by Scripture

is limited by the medium through which it is communicated.
Origen implies that some human individuals (for example, the
author of John's gospel or Paul) have a direct relationship
to these inexpressible mysteries, and are able to obtain
more complete knowledge of God than could be communicated in
writing.15
believer.

This is clearly not possible for the average
Origen seems to have included this codicil re-

garding the trustworthiness of Scripture to avoid

11

idolatry 11

in regard to Scripture, rather than to recommend some alternative source for knowledge of God.
the existence of ultimate truth,

Origen wants to stress
the

11

eternal gospel 11 to

which Scripture points, but which it cannot entirely communicate, rather than to suggest this eternal gospel as a replacement for Scripture.16
This quasi-independence of divine truth from the

14

scriptural text is another reason why the exegete is dependent upon divine assistance to interpret the text.

The

frailty of human language, which prevents Scripture from
containing and revealing the complete, eternal truth of God
also afflicts the other forms of human knowledge.
fore,

There-

such knowledge is of limited usefulness in interpret-

ing Scripture.

Although he employs "secular" techniques of

textual and literary criticism as a preliminary phase of his
exegesis,

often using these techniques to establish the

text's literal/historical meaning,

Origen primarily relies

upon Scripture itself to interpret Scripture.

Since Scrip-

ture must be accepted as a unified whole, difficult passages
within Scripture must be understood in the light of the rest
of Scripture.l7
The illumination that Scripture imparts to difficult
passages may take several forms.

A New Testament author may

include, and thus interpret, an Old Testament passage within
his inspired text.

When this occurs,

the New Testament

author's interpretation is inspired and authoritative.l8
In some instances,
instructions.

Scripture itself provides exegetical

Origen points to the letters of Paul as

providing instructions for correctly interpreting the Law,
and to Proverbs as

establishing the "three-fold sense of

Scripture" principle which is so prominent in Origen' s
writings.l9

15

II.

Scripture's Three Levels of Meaning
In this examination of Origen•s understanding of the

nature of Scripture, mention has been made of his principle
of the three levels of meaning which Scripture contains.
This theory is prominent in Origen•s exegetical writings,
and an examination of this theory is necessary to understanding how Origen perceives Scripture, and how he interprets

it.

Origen describes

this theory clearly in De

Principiis IV,2,4:
One must therefore portray the meaning of Scripture in a
three-fold way upon one's own soul, so that the simple
man may be edified by what we may call the flesh of the
scripture, this name being given to the obvious meaning
of scripture; while the man who has made some progress
may be edified by its soul, as it were; and the man who
is perfect ... may be edified by the spiritual law,
which has •a shadow of the good things to come.•
For
just as a man consists of body, soul and spirit, so in
the same way does scripture, which has been prepared by
God to be given for man's salvation.20
This passage has several ambiguities.

The first is

the way in which Origen intends this theory to be applied in
exegesis.

The most common understanding among scholars is

that Origen maintains that the three levels of meaning in
Scripture are all valid, but useful for different types of
men.

The "obvious meaning 11 of Scripture is useful and

edifying for simple believers, who are incapable of comprebending the deeper meaning, the "mysteries" of Scripture.
Scripture's level of meaning which corresponds to the soul
is edifying for those who have advanced from simple belief,
but who have not yet achieved a

"spiritual capacity" as

16

such.

The highest or deepest level of meaning is the path-

way of perfection proper--the level at which the believer
is able to perceive the spiritual truths.21
The passage cited above certainly supports this
understanding, but with some ambiguity.

Origen advises that

we apply this threefold meaning "to our own soul," and implies that the reason why Scripture has been endowed with
this tri-level structure of meaning is to allow Scripture to
correspond to the three parts of the human individual--not
for the edification of three types of men.

Nevertheless,

Origen himself does apply this distinction of the three
levels of meaning in Scripture for the benefit of three
types of men.
extent,

This ambiguity might be resolved,

to some

by positing that the three types of men to whom

Origen refers the specific levels of Scripture are divided
into groups on the basis of which parts of the human individual predominate in their characters.

For example,

the concerns of the flesh occupy a given individual,

if

then

the "fleshly" meaning of Scripture would be the level most
appropriate to such an individual's present condition, and
Origen maintains that even this level of Scripture is able
to lead the individual towards the spiritual level.22
This adjustment in the interpretation of Origen
implies that all three levels of meaning are valuable for
all human individuals,
predominantly useful.

but that one or another level is

For the advanced Christian, the spir-

11

itual level would be of primary benefit, although even the
obvious meaning of a given text would have some value.
Thus,

an exegesis of each level of meaning in Scripture

would be appropriate in public discourse, regardless of the
supposed "spirituality" of the audience.

Origen includes

an interpretation of all three levels of Scripture's meaning
in both his homilies

(which might be expected to have a

broader, more general audience in mind) and in his commentaries (which might be expected to be addressed to the more
advanced).

Since Origen includes literal interpretations of

Scripture in his more spiritual writings, and spiritual
interpretations of Scripture in his more popular writings,
he clearly believes that all the levels of meaning within
Scripture are valuable for everyone.

The fact that the

obvious meaning almost invariably receives less attention,
and Origen consistently urges his audience to advance beyond
this level, need not be seen as contrary evidence.

Origen

is concerned with the spiritual progress of his audience,
which would require a growing ability to perceive and appreciate the deeper meanings of Scripture.23
But even with this adjustment, the tri-level structure of the meaning of Scripture which Origen presents in De
Principiis IV,2,4 contains a second ambiguity in regard to
the relationship of these different levels to each other,
and the presence of each level of meaning in every passage
of Scripture.

Modern scholars have frequently pointed to
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the ambiguity of the level of meaning corresponding to the
soul.

This level seems to refer to the moral meaning of a

scriptural passage, which would primarily apply to the improvement of the individual believer.24

But J.N.D. Kelly

points out that in practice, Origen tends to employ an alternate middle level of meaning in Scripture:

the typo-

logical meaning, which would apply to the improvement of the
Church as a whole.25
But, as several scholars have pointed out, Origen
does not consistently follow this tri-level theory in his
own exegetical writings.

Often, he simply distinguishes

between the letter, or the obvious meaning, of Scripture
(the body) and the higher meaning of Scripture (the spirit).26

Sometimes, Origen explicitly includes the moral

level as one aspect of the spiritual level; sometimes the
moral level is omitted altogether.27

On the other hand,

the moral meaning may be the only "higher," spiritual meaning which a passage contains.

In one of his homilies,

Origen argues that the moral meaning of Scripture sometimes
has the highest meaning available to mankind, and no effort
should be made to go beyond it.28

Yet in De Principiis,

Origen declares that while not all of Scripture has meaning
on the lowest level, all Scripture does have meaning on the
highest level.

So in some instances,

the spiritual meaning of a text.

the moral meaning is

The result of this con-

fusion is that while the tri-level theory is an essential
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aspect of Origen's over-all understanding of Scripture, his
actual exegesis seems to depend upon a bi-level distinction
between the "bodi 1 y, " or obvious, meaning of Scripture and
the "spiritual" meaning of Scripture,

which may include

either a moral meaning, or an approximation of eternal/spiritual meaning, or both.
Origen's understanding of Scripture (and the human
person, and reality as a whole) is fundamentally dualistic.
Origen adopts the Platonic distinction between the finite,
imperfect, material and sensible world, and the infinite and
perfect existence of ideas.

The three levels which Origen

postulates within Scripture are an attempt to distinguish
between the partial experience of the ideal realm which man
currently possesses,

and the more complete and perfect ex-

perience of this realm which man once possessed, and is
destined to regain.

The distinction between the soul and

the spirit is an attempt to maintain a spiritual element
within every individual, while acknowledging that this spiritual element is not presently perfect.

III.

Origen's Exegesis:

The Allegorical Method

The rest of this chapter will examine how the "spiritual .. and "bodily" levels are related in Origen's exegesis,
and how one moves from one level to the other.
The language employed by Origen to distinguish between the two levels of meaning in Scripture--the spiritual
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meaning and the bodily meaning--indicates something about
the relationship between the two.

Just as an individual's

soul is "clothed" by the individual's body, the spiritual
meaning of Scripture is clothed by the body of the text--and
the bodily meaning of the text.29

One obvious result of

this "clothing" is that the spiritual meaning is not immediately apparent in the text,
visible in the human body.

any more than a human soul is
In this sense, at least, Origen

speaks of the text of Scripture as "veiling" or concealing
the spiritual sense.30

Therefore,

Origen considers the

spiritual sense to be hidden within the bodily meaning of
the text of Scripture just as the human soul is hidden within the body.
The method which Origen employs to ascertain and
interpret the hidden spiritual meaning within Scripture is
allegory.

If the spiritual meaning is hidden within the

bodily meaning of Scripture, then the spiritual meaning must
differ from the bodily meaning.

Allegory refers both to the

text which contains a hidden spiritual meaning, and to the
technique which enables the exegete to move from the bodily
meaning to the spiritual meaning.31
If the spiritual meaning is completely unrelated to
the bodily meaning,
pletely arbitrary.
be related:

such an interpretation would be com-

But Origen understands the two levels to

the body of Scripture is a "copy" or "shadow"

of the spiritual meaning contained within it.32

In some
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sense,

the bodily meaning of a scriptural text symbolizes

its spiritual meaning.

Allegory is the method of inter-

pretation which reveals this hidden meaning of the symbols
in the text.33
But Scripture only hides the spiritual meaning of
a passage so that the meaning might be communicated more
effectively and appropriately.

Origen asserts that an alle-

gory is a powerful means of conveying truth.

"Clothing"

the deeper meaning of Scripture in another, more obvious
meaning incites the curiosity of the learned and compels
the respect of the unlearned.34

The manner in which Origen

extracts the spiritual meaning from an allegorical text
directly corresponds to the manner in which he understands
the text to contain and communicate the spiritual meaning.
A close examination of Origen's exegetical techniques reveals the character of the relationship between the text
and its underlying, spiritual meaning.
Thus far, allegorical interpretation has been taken
to refer to any kind of non-literal interpretation of the
text.

In the history of Christian exegesis, non-literal

interpretations of the Bible have generally been one of two
kinds:

allegorical or typological.

The distinction between

these two forms of non-literal interpretation is not always
clear in scholarly research, but R.P.C. Hanson's definitions
of these terms are quite helpful.

Typology is the inter-

preting of an event described in one passage of Scripture
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as the fulfillment of a similar situation found in another
scriptural passage.
a text

Allegory is interpreting a figure in

(a person or event) as actually meaning something

else.35
Typology interprets a text by noting and explaining
the similarities between the figure in one text, and another
figure in another text.

Thus, the serpent which Moses fash-

ioned and set upon a staff is a type of Christ:
serpent and Christ were "lifted up" as God 1 s
for salvation.

both the
instrument

The elaboration of the similarities between

Christ and the serpent is the task of typological interpretation.

The characteristics of one are used to explain

the implied characteristics of the other.

Thus, typological

interpretation examines two similar texts in light of each
other.
Allegorical interpretation, on the other hand, attempts to move between two levels of meaning within a single
text.

Allegory may refer to other scriptural texts in order

to establish the correspondence between the two levels of
meaning by identifying a common symbolism used throughout
Scripture.

But the texts are not taken as referring to each

other, as in typological interpretation.

In allegory,

the

correspondence between the figure found in the bodily meaning and the spiritual meaning of the text often relies upon
the consistent use of a specific symbol in Scripture.
When Origen explains his allegorical method,

he
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uses the example of Scripture•s habitual use of Israel and
Jerusalem as symbols of a specific kind of spiritual existence.

Origen establishes that Scripture consistently uses

Israel and Jerusalem to refer to a heavenly existence by
adducing various passages where this symbolism is explicit
(e.g., Gal. 4:26).

He then applies this symbolism to vari-

ous texts in which Jerusalem and/or Israel appear, and even
to texts which refer to other nations and cities, where such
references either are not or cannot be literally true.36
In this description of his allegorical method,
Origen does not make a detailed comparison of two or more
texts which contain references to Jerusalem.

Nor does he

elaborately describe the characteristics of the earthly
Jerusalem which make it an appropriate symbol for a heavenly
existence.

The primary thrust of his argument is that this

symbolism is used in various texts, and he shows how this
symbolism leads to a proper spiritual interpretation of
these texts.
(e.g.,

The intrinsic similarity between the symbol

Jerusalem)

and what is symbolized (e.g., heavenly

existence), is not explored in any detail, and often appears
to be a very tenuous similarity.
In Origen•s allegorical method, such intrinsic similarity between the bodily meaning and the spiritual meaning
must be tenuous.

The spiritual meaning of Scripture is

intended to communicate divine, eternal truths, and such
truths could not possess the same similarity with the fig-
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ures which represent them that two similar earthly figures
might possess.

This very fact is one reason why Origen

tends to devalue typology.

Although he uses typological

interpretations in his exegesis, Origen perceives this technique as producing information about non-spiritual matters,
and therefore typology is not an adequate technique for
ascertaining the spiritual meaning of Scripture.37
But if some sort of intrinsic similarity between the
spiritual meaning and the bodily meaning of the text which
"clothes" it is ruled out by the nature of the spiritual
meaning,

is there any correspondence between the text and

the allegorical interpretation, outside of the interpreter's
imagination?
exists.38

Many scholars deny that any such connection

But Origen calls the bodily sense of Scripture a

"shadow" or "copy" of the spiritual sense, so he apparently
conceives of some such connection.

The manner in which

Origen develops his allegorical interpretations also indicates that the relationship between the text and the allegory interpreting it are not solely dependent upon his own
fancy.
In his commentaries, Origen's first exegetical move
is to establish the text and its literal (or "proper") meaning.39

The pains which Origen takes to achieve this purpose

involves considerable erudition.
cated literary analysis,

Origen employs sophisti-

including lexicography, etymology

and careful consideration of the context of a given pas-
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sage, in his effort to reveal the bodily sense of the text.
Origen is acutely aware that even the literal meaning of a
given passage is not always obvious.40

The care and skill

which Origen brings to this task justify Trigg's assessment
that he is "one of the greatest interpreters of the Bible on
the literal level in the early Church."41
Origen's assertion that the simple believer can
benefit from the bodily meaning of Scripture cannot sufficiently account for the effort which Origen expends in explaining the literal meaning of a text, especially if Origen
simply intends to abandon this meaning once it has been
ascertained.

Undeniably,

Origen considers it necessary

to move beyond the literal meaning; but the care with which
he establishes the literal meaning is evidence that such a
move depends upon a careful and complete understanding of
the bodily meaning of the text.

Origen's subsequent exe-

gesis indicates the nature of this dependence.
Having ascertained the proper literal interpretation, Origen insists that the "exact reader" should
carefully investigate how far the literal meaning is
true and how far it is impossible, and to the utmost
of his power trace out from the use of similar expressions the meaning scattered everywhere throughout the
scriptures of that which when taken literally is
impossible.42
This passage provides the key to Origen's allegorical method
and the way he thinks the text of Scripture corresponds to
the spiritual meaning of Scripture.

Origen's maxim that

"all of Scripture has a spiritual meaning, but not all of
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Scripture has a literal meaning" must be understood within
the context of this passage.43
Scripture is,

The literal meaning of

by and large, accurate and authoritative.44

But on occasion, the literal meaning of a scriptural passage
will be false:
accurate.45

either impossible or absurd, or simply inThese occasions of error within the literal

sense of the text are not accidental; they accord with God's
over-all purpose for Scripture of leading mankind to divine
truth,

and are therefore spiritually true.

God includes

such "stumbling-blocks" within the literal meaning of certain scriptural texts to indicate the existence of the spiritual meaning of Scripture as a whole.

Without such state-

ments, the reader would have no reason to look more carefully into the text.46
The occasional fallacies within the literal meaning
of a specific text act as reminders that all Scripture has
a spiritual meaning, and these fallacies also provide clues
regarding what that spiritual meaning might be.
clues are indirect.

But these

To correctly interpret the passage in

question, Origen advises the exegete to identify the literally false statements within a passage and then to "trace
out the use of similar expressions" in the rest of Scripture.

The way such expressions are used in other passages

of Scripture may shed light upon the spiritual meaning which
these expressions are intended to indicate in the text in
question.
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Many scholars have pointed out Origen•s habit of
associating key words and concepts of a scriptural text
with other occurrences of the same words and concepts elsewhere in Scripture.47

The fact that Origen•s allegories

tend to arise in response to passages which Origen finds
problematic is also well established.48

In the passage from

De Principiis IV,3,5 quoted above, Origen explicitly links
these two exegetical habits.

Together they provide a method

for ascertaining the spiritual meaning contained within a
specific text.

The fallacious statement discovered in a

text is compared to similar instances of that statement
found elsewhere in Scripture.

The information obtained from

this comparison points to the spiritually true meaning which
the literally false statement is meant to convey.
this particular spiritual meaning as the key,

With
the entire

passage in which the original "stumbling-block" occurs can
then be allegorically interpreted.49
The connection between the spiritual meaning of
Scripture and the text thus depends upon the passages of
the text which are literally untrue, and the occurrence
of similar passages in other parts of Scripture which indicate the spiritual meaning of these literally untenable
passages.

The literal meaning of a text must be correctly

ascertained in order to correctly identify the limits of
that literal meaning.

Where the literal meaning breaks

down, the spiritual meaning is able to be perceived through
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comparison with similar texts.

When the

11

Stumbling-blocks"

of a text have been spiritually interpreted in this fashion,
the entire passage must be interpreted spiritually.

Once he

has correctly interpreted the specific symbols found within
a problematic text,

Origen allegorically interprets the

entire passage which contains that text.
of the

11

The interpretation

Stumbling-block" invokes specific categories of the

spiritual meaning of Scripture.

Such an invocation brings

all of the symbolic meanings and implications concerning
spiritual truths in general into the interpretation of the
entire passage which contains the stumbling-block.

Thus,

Origen constructs an integrated allegorical interpretation
of an entire passage,

based upon the symbolism contained

within a literally false expression found in that passage,
or carried over from another passage.

IV.

Conclusion
From this examination of Origen's general under-

standing of Scripture, we have seen that Origen considers
Scripture to be the means by which God leads man to a union
with himself.

This union is accomplished by man coming to

perceive divine truth.

Since Scripture is the divinely

inspired medium of such truth, Scripture is trustworthy and
authoritative.
Nevertheless, Scripture by itself is not absolute.
In order for Scripture to lead man to divine truth, it must
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be correctly interpreted.

The correct interpretation of

Scripture requires that Scripture be interpreted as a whole,
and each scriptural passage must be understood in the light
of the rest of Scripture.
Furthermore, the correct interpretation of Scripture
requires the assistance of divine inspiration.

In order for

Scripture to be correctly understood, the same Spirit which
inspired the scriptural author must also inspire the scriptural exegete.

This inspiration is necessary because scrip-

tural passages need to be interpreted in light of each other, and the Spirit enables the exegete to discern and apply
the more general meaning of Scripture to the interpretation
of a specific passage.
But the assistance of the Spirit is also necessary
because Scripture is written in human language, which is
inherently incapable of adequately conveying the divine
truth which it is meant to convey.

Due to the frailty of

human language, Scripture can only indicate or point to
the divine truth which lies beyond it.

The interpreter of

Scripture can only discern this truth under the direction
of the Spirit.
Thus, Origen understands Scripture to consist of
two levels:

the "bodily" level, the literal or proper

meaning of Scripture, and the "spiritual" level.
Origen presents a

Although

theory which describes three levels of

meaning within Scripture, which includes a

"psychic" or
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"soul" level of meaning between the bodily and spiritual
levels, the practical application of his theory relies upon
a bi-level understanding of Scripture.

The intermediate,

psychic level exists as a way of discussing the spiritual
level of meaning in finite human terms.

The level of mean-

ing which corresponds to the soul refers to the needs and
circumstances of the spiritually immature or imperfect.
Nevertheless, this level deals with spiritual concerns.
The three levels of Origen's theory of Scripture
are best identified as the bodily meaning of Scripture,
the finite (or imperfect) spiritual meaning, and the infinite (or perfect) spiritual meaning.

Therefore, there are

actually two levels of meaning within Scripture:
ily and the spiritual.

the bod-

But the spiritual meaning might be

either finite and provisional, or infinite and perfect.
Origen thinks

that the relationship between the

bodily and spiritual meanings of Scripture roughly corresponds to the relationship between the human body and soul.
The bodily meaning of Scripture "clothes"--and to some extent,

therefore, conceals--the spiritual meaning.

But this

concealment is actually an effective form of communication.
By being hidden within the bodily meaning of Scripture, the
spiritual meaning acts as a lure to the curiosity of the
learned,

and inspires the respect of the unlearned.

The

concealment of the spiritual meaning is a more effective
mode of communicating this meaning than an explicit state-
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ment of this deeper level of meaning.
The bodily meaning of Scripture is able to point to
and communicate the spiritual meaning through the errors
which God incorporates in the bodily meaning.
ities,

Impossibil-

absurdities and non-factual aspects of the literal

meaning of Scripture indicate the existence of the spiritual
Furthermore,

meaning.

these flaws in the literal sense of

Scripture provide clues about the content of the spiritual
meaning.

Other instances in Scripture where these same

problematic passages occur establish a pattern of symbolism which enables the correct spiritual interpretation of
specific passages.

This pattern of symbolism provides a

bridgehead between the bodily meaning of Scripture and the
spiritual meaning.

Once the connection between these two

levels of meaning has been established through the symbolism
involved in a particular, literally non-factual passage, the
entire text which contains this passage can be interpreted
on the spiritual level.
Origen•s overall understanding of Scripture provides
a context within which his interpretations of the two stories of the creation of man can be discussed.

The next chap-

ter of this thesis will examine these interpretations.

CHAPTER II
ORIGEM'S INTERPRETATIONS OF GEN 1:26-30 AND
GEN 2:4-9
Since Origen's Commentary on Genesis has been lost,
the principal source for Origen's interpretation of the
first creation of man story in Gen 1:26-30 is the last six
chapters of his first Homily on Genesis, which deal directly
with the interpretation of these verses.

In his homilies,

Origen is primarily concerned with the edification of the
Church.

Therefore, the Homilies tend to stress the spiritu-

al content of Scripture over the literal content, since an
appreciation of the spiritual meaning of Scripture is an
important advance in the spiritual life of the individual
and the Church.!
But Origen's first Homily on Genesis particularly
tends to focus upon the moral aspects of this higher sense
of Scripture.

In this work,

Origen is not primarily con-

cerned with presenting truths about the creation and arrangement of the world;

cosmology is not really an issue

throughout the entire homily.
man,

Neither is the creation of

in itself, a primary concern in this work.

Origen wishes to discuss the

'moral psychology'

within the story of the creation of man.2

Instead,
implicit

In other words,

Origen is less interested in discussing the description of
human nature embedded in the story of man's creation, and
32
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far more interested in discussing the moral demands which
are made upon man.

Nevertheless, since the nature of the

human individual in some sense determines the conduct proper
to the individual, a great deal of Origen's anthropology is
contained in the interpretation of Gen 1:26-30 found in the
last part of his first Homily on Genesis.

An implicit an-

thropology lies behind the explicitly moral allegory which
Origen presents in this work.
Just as the overall intention of the first Homily
on Genesis colors the manner in which Origen interprets Gen
1:26-30, and also the manner in which the anthropology implicit in this interpretation may be extracted, so also do
the contexts of Origen•s other works which contain an interpretation of this passage color that interpretation.

In

each case,

in

these contexts must be taken into account,

order to retrieve the anthropological implications contained
within the exegesis.

As a rule, the works which contain

allusions to Gen 1:26-30, other than the first Homily on
Genesis, actually interpret other scriptural passages.

Con-

sistent with his overall exegetical method, Origen uses Gen
1:26-30_to interpret other scriptural texts when a key word
or phrase appears in both passages.

Origen also uses this

story of the creation of man to reinforce theological positions which he presents in his more theoretical work, De
~rincipiis.

Finally, Origen interprets both creation stor-

ies in the Contra Celsum,

in which he is attempting to de-
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fend the legitimacy of the Jewish-Christian Scriptures,
and their superiority over pagan writings.
Fortunately,

in each of these cases,

the overall

context leads Origen to emphasize the spiritual meaning of
the texts with which he works, and this is precisely the
level in which Origen finds and explains eternal truths-such as the fundamental nature of man, man's relationship
with God,
salvation.

and the doctrines of the Church concerning man's
But since a scriptural passage can contain more

than one spiritual meaning, different contexts will require
that Origen interpret the same passage differently.
The procedure followed in this chapter will attempt
to accommodate this variation.

First, Origen's exegesis of

Gen 1:26-30 in his first Homily on Genesis will be presented.

Then the key anthropological points of this exegesis

will be compared to the points made in the interpretations
of this passage found in other works.

An attempt will

be

made to identify the consistent features of Origen's exegesis of this passage, and to place the variations of his
interpretation within a coherent framework.

A similar pro-

cedure will then be used in examining Origen's exegesis of
Gen 2:4-9.

I.

Origen's First Homily on Genesis
Origen begins his examination of Gen 1:26-30 in the

last half of chapter 12 of his first Homily on Genesis.
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The first half of this chapter focuses upon the

11

dominion"

which man is to exercise over the fish of the sea, the birds
of heaven and the animals on the earth, and the whole earth
itself.

Origen has already discussed what these creatures

symbolically represent.

The water symbolizes man's mind;

fish therefore represent affections and desires which arise
from and move in the mind.3

Birds are heavenly impulses.

Beasts and creeping creatures, which are brought forth from
and move upon the earth, are carnal impulses; Origen consistently interprets the earth itself as representing the
body.4

Since man is given dominion over all these crea-

tures, Origen believes Gen 1:26 indicates that man's mind,
which produces

11

according to the spiritual sense" and which

is therefore the more divine aspect of man, should rule
the body and all that 1 t produces "according to the carnal
sense."

God intends man's mind, and the spiritual impulses

and desires which proceed from the mind,

to rule and re-

strain man's carnal impulses and desires.
In the last part of chapter 12 of his first Homily
on Genesis, Origen turns his attention to the implications
concerning man's place in the universe which the words "And
God said, Let us make man ... " have.

He notes that most of

creation has been created at the command of God, that is, by
God saying, "Let there be .... "

But the first "elements" of

the creation story, heaven and earth,

the two great lights

in the heavens and man are all described as being direct
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works of God:
God made ... 11

;

Scripture has the first two described as

11

And

man's creation is narrated by "And God said,

Let us make ..... and later,

11

And God made ... "

For Origen,

this similarity in the narrative indicates some kind of
similarity between

11

the heaven and the earth 11 of Gen 1:1,

the two great lights of Gen 1:16, and man, at least in terms
of their prestige in the created order.

Since these things

are the direct works of God, and not just the result of his
command, they have a somewhat higher position in the universe.

Thus man is the equal of these other direct works

of God, and is destined to share aspects of their relationship to God.

He is promised the kingdom of heaven,

the

inheritance of a good land, and the brilliance of the sun,
when he has reached perfection.5
Next, Origen tries to analyze who it is that is made
in the image and likeness of God.

Since God is not corpore-

al, it cannot be that corporeal man is made in God's image;
the form of the body cannot contain the image of God.

(An

important aside indicates that corporeal man is the subject
of Gen 2 : 4-9 :

corporeal man is

11

formed 11 not

stead, Origen claims that it is our "inner,
that is made in the image of God.
important:

made.

11

)

In-

incorporeal man

The possessive pronoun is

one aspect of our human natures is the subject

of Gen 1:26-30.6
of human,

11

11

This verse does not refer to another sort

but to one aspect of our own selves of which we

may or may not be aware.
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The

11

inner 11 man to which this verse refers is invis-

ible, incorporeal, incorruptible and immortal.

These quali-

ties seem to be the sense in which the inner man is made in
God's image.

Since the inner man has these qualities, we

know that it is the inner man that has been created in the
image of God.?
At this point, Origen rebukes those who think that
God's image should be understood corporeally.

Such an in-

terpretation involves an anthropomorphic understanding of
God which Origen categorically rejects.

God cannot be con-

ceived of in spatial or corporeal terms;

therefore,

God's

image cannot be conceived of in these terms.
Origen also rejects the concept of the "whole man 11
being the image of God.

Origen reemphasizes his understand-

ing of man as a composite creature; man is made up of various hierarchically related parts.
is meant to rule his body.

Man's spirit or mind

But Origen insists that we can-

not speak of different, unequal parts existing in God.

It

makes no sense to think of God as having one part which
rules over another.

Therefore, the composite nature of man,

and the harmonious relationship between the different aspects of man's nature, is not the image of God which man
possesses.

Only the

11

inner man," the spirit or reason with-

in man can adequately reflect the simplicity of the divine
nature, and therefore deserve the title

11

image of God ...

In the course of this argument, Origen makes refer-
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ence to at least two, and possibly three types of men.

He

clearly indicates that there are those who are "citizens of
heaven," the perfect.

He makes an equally clear reference

to those "involved in earthly details," who are far removed
from God's influence, at least in terms of desire for God.
But when Origen asserts that this latter type of man can be
changed,

he may indicate the existence of a third group:

"those who have their treasures in heaven"--but who are not
yet themselves citizens of heaven.
The heart of Origen's exegesis of "And God said, Let
us make man according to our image and likeness" focuses on
the words "according,"

"likeness" and "image."

He first

asks what the image of God is, to which likeness man is to
be formed.

This question seems to indicate that "image" is

not identical to "likeness" for Origen.

Strictly speaking,

the image is the model to which something is made similar;
the likeness is the similarity to the model in what is made
according to the model. 8

Using various citations, Origen

asserts that the only image of God to which man could have
been made similar is the Savior, Jesus Christ, the Word of
God.

Thus, from the very beginning, the "inner," spiritual

man has a correspondence, a relationship with the Word, the
Savior.
This relationship predetermines the pattern of man's
redemption.
the Savior,

The fall was man's laying aside the image of
to adopt another image,

that of the evil one.
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Therefore, to save man, the Savior adopted the image of man.
~

did so,

man;

due to his original, natural relationship with

he did this, because this method corresponded to and

reversed the pattern of the fall.

The fall of man was ac-

complished by man's rejection of his similarity to the
Logos.

The redemption of man is accomplished by the Sav-

ior's reassertion of this similarity, through assuming human
nature.

The process of salvation is the process of renewing

the image of the Savior in the inner man; being made similar, once again, to our original prototype.

Likeness to the

Savior is our natural condition; the image of the evil one
is foreign to us by nature, but by "beholding the image of
the dev i 1 , " we have adopted this image.

But by beholding

the image of God, man can be returned to likeness with the
image of God,

and this process is more sure, since this

transformation is a return to what is natural for man.9
Two significant implications are contained in this
analysis of the human condition.

The first is that the

recovery process is more sure than the process of corruption, not only because the "model" (and in some sense, the
agent)

of recuperation is stronger than the "model"

(and

agent) of corruption--that is, the Savior is superior to
the devil--but also because returning to what is natural is
easier than abandoning what is natural.

A second important

implication is the role of "beholding" and contemplation in
both the process of the fall and the process of salvation.
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Origen does not explain this role, but in some way, contemplation connects the original and final states of man in
both processes.
Origen's consideration of the next verse is little
more than a digression.
accounts of why,

He gives two different "literal"

at this point in this creation story,

Scripture records that God created man "male and female."
The first reason is to provide a credible context for the
blessing "increase and multiply."

Without sexual differen-

tiation, this command is not believable, because the joining
of the two sexes is the only way man knows of increasing and
multiplying.

Or it is possible that this verse aerely re-

flects the proper coordination of two related but dissimilar elements which characterizes God's creation; everything
which God creates is created in harmony and with an appropriate conjoining partner.

Thus heaven and earth, and the

sun and the moon (the other two examples of God's "own"
creation) are paired in a kind of conjunction, and mankind
should also involve a similar conjunction of male and female.

But even so,

tion";

unlike the heaven and the earth, and the sun and

the moon,

this verse is recorded in "anticipa-

man is not actually "conjoined" by the differen-

tiation of male and female until later, presumably after
mankind is embodied.lO
The second and spiritual meaning of this verse is
more relevant to the anthropological view Origen seems to
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be establishing.

This verse indicates that the inner man,

which is the aspect of human nature created in the image of
God,

consists of two hierarchically related parts, spirit

(male)

and soul

(female).ll

When these two parts are in

accord, their union is "fruitful":

they produce good incli-

nations according to the command to increase and multiply.
More specifically, when these two elements of the inner man
are in harmony,

they are able to "fill the earth and have

dominion over it ...

As

has been his practice throughout

this homily, Origen takes "earth" to refer figuratively to
the flesh,

and the carnal desires that arise from the em-

bodiment of the inner man.

When the inner man is in har-

mony, the flesh is properly subjected to the inner man, and
the inclinations of the flesh are able to be turned to better purposes.

When the soul is in harmony with the spirit

--and due to the hierarchical relationship which Origen
seems to presuppose between the two, this means when the
soul is obedient to,

or aligned with, the spirit--then the

flesh is obedient to the will of the spirit.
But if the soul turns toward the flesh, and the desires of the flesh,
the flesh,

the union will be between the soul and

and this union is "adulterous" and unfruitful.

Such a soul does not increase and multiply, but is condemned
as a harlot.

This is not a very explicit description of

such a .. rebellious" or "adulterous" soul.

The crucial ques-

tion is whether or not the soul is corrupted by this union
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with the flesh.

If it is, then only the spiritual part of

the inner man is made in God's image, since this is the
only incorruptible part of the inner man.

If the soul is

not corrupted by this union, it is unclear what damage, if
any, has been done to the soul.

It may be that the harm of

such a union rests only with the "offspring":
tions which such a union produces.12
will be barren and unfruitful.

the inclina-

These inclinations

The appropriate union be-

tween the soul and the spirit will not exist and therefore
will not produce good inclinations.

Neither the soul nor

the spirit will have suffered damage to their essences, but
their function of producing good inclinations will have been
frustrated.
The interpretation of Gen 1:28 focuses on desires
and inclinations of the soul.

The inner man is given domin-

ion over fish and birds, and animals and creeping things.
Consistent with Origen•s established practice of interpreting the upper waters as the mind (or the spirit), and earth
as the flesh,

the fish and birds symbolize rational and

heavenly thoughts and inclinations; the animals and creeping
things represent carnal desires and impulses.

Apparently,

all of these will exist regardless of the harmony or disharmony of the spirit and the soul.

But the "saints," those

whose spirits rule their souls, and therefore also hold the
flesh in subjection, have preserved God's blessing of having
dominion over all such thoughts,

inclinations, desires and
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impulses.

In the 1 i ves of the saints,

guided by the will of the spirit. 11

"the whole man is

In sinners, where the

proper orientation of soul toward spirit is lost, the base
and carnal impulses have dominion over the whole aan.13
An interesting issue arising from all this is the
role of the body.

It does not seem to play an active role

--and probably should not play any role at all, since the
inner man in question in this entire exegesis is not yet
embodied (unless we assume that all of this is also said
11

in anticipation") .14

Yet there are carnal impulses and

desires, apparently belonging to a disembodied soul.

It is

possible that Origen maintains that the soul has some sort
of desire for the flesh (hence, "carnal desires"), but that
these desires may have a part to play, or at least may be
used, in the relationship of the spirit to the soul.

But if

the soul does not turn the desires to good use, but turns
towards them instead, then eventually this inner man will be
embodied.

But it is not clear what sort of thing the soul

is, which can have carnal desires without a body.
As if in support of the odd theory that

11

carnal 11 de-

sires can contribute positively to the relationship of the
soul to the spirit, and thus to the

11

inner man 11 as a whole,

Origen deals with the dietary arrangement of the first creation in an allegorical fashion which explains how this can
be the case.

Once again,

the products of the earth (like

all other things associated with the earth in the narrative)
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is understood as being carnal.

Thus the vegetation given to

the inner man as food represents carnal desires, or bodily
affections.

These can be turned to good use, and such seems

to be their original purpose.

Origen uses positive instan-

ces of indignation and concupiscence, drawn from various
scriptural passages,

to reinforce this point.

But such

affections can be used against the will of the spirit, which
is rational, and the irrational indulgence of these affections makes them

11

food for beasts 11 --that is, such a course

encourages and reinforces the dominion of carnal desires
over the sinning human individual.

The fact that the narra-

tive has God giving these "plants" of bodily affections to
man as food,

but only observing that these same plants are

food for beasts reinforces Origen's interpretation.

God's

command reveals God's intention for these affections; God's
observation reflects God's judgment upon the misuse of these
affections.15
In his first Homily on Genesis,

Origen draws three

conclusions from his interpretation of Gen 1:26-30.

First,

he maintains that this passage witnesses to the fact that
only the "inner man" has been made according to the image of
God.

Origen offers two proofs of this assertion.

The inner

man is incorporeal, immortal and incorruptible, and in this
way the inner man is similar to God.

No other aspect of the

human individual can claim such similarity to God.

God is
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not corporeal, nor is God a composite being.

So neither

the body, which is corporeal, nor the whole man, which is
composite, can be similar to God.
Origen qualifies the similarity which exists between
God and man by insisting that actually, man is similar to
the Logos.

The Word of God is the image of God, and man

has been made according to this image.

This is the second

conclusion which Origen draws from his interpretation of Gen
1:26-30.
Finally,

Origen turns his attention back to man's

nature, and concludes that Gen 1:26-30 reveals the tripartite character of man's nature, and the proper relationship which these parts should have to each other.
composed of spirit, soul and body.

Man is

Since the spirit is the

highest aspect of man's nature, Origen concludes that man's
spirit is the specific aspect which has been made according
to the image of God.

When the spirit rules over the soul,

their union produces overall harmony within man.
body, and carnal desires,
use by this union.

Man's

are dominated and turned to good

But if the soul turns to the body,

the

body and its desires and impulses will rule the soul and the
spirit.
These three conclusions are the basis for comparing
Origen's other interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 with the interpretation found in his first Homily on Genesis.
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II.

Theological/Anthropological Aspects of Other
Interpretations of Gen 1:26-30
Origen's exegesis of Gen 1:26-30 in his first Homily

on Genesis clearly indicates that when Origen deals with
this scriptural text,

he believes that the relationship of

the individual to God is the primary issue.

But the text

presents him with the problem of dealing with three distinct
aspects of this relationship.

These problematic aspects

shape Origen's interpretations of this text found in his
other writings as well.
11

The problem is the question of how

being made according to the image and likeness of God,. is

to be interpreted.

Clearly this phrase indicates some simi-

larity between the individual and God, but Origen feels obliged to specify what sort of similarity this text implies.
Does this similarity apply to the essences of God and the
individual, or to their activities, or to their accidental
characteristics?

And what is the content of the similarity

between God and the individual?

In his first Homily on

Genesis, Origen asserts that man is similar to God in the
sense that both are immortal,

invisible and incorruptible.

But other interpretations present alternatives for the content of this similarity.
30,

When Origen interprets Gen 1:26

questions of this sort tend to arise,

and Origen's

answers are not always the same in every case.
A second problematic aspect of the relation between
God and man which Origen finds in Gen 1:26-30 is the question of the relationship between man and the Word of God

47

implied in this text.
on Genesis,

As we have seen in the first Homily

Origen finds a reference to the Logos in this

text in the phrase "image of God."

The way man is related

to the Logos is one link which Origen himself forges between
the anthropology he finds expressed in Gen 1:26-30, and the
soteriology which this anthropological view predetermines.
Therefore,

it is natural that the relationship between the

Logos and man is a recurrent topic in Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-30.
Finally, and most importantly in regard to Origen's
theological anthropology,

Origen attempts to interpret Gen

1:26-30 in such a way as to discover what aspect of man is
made according to the image and likeness of God.

We have

seen that Origen struggles with the question of how man is
similar to God by discussing the possible characteristics
which God and man have in common.

But Origen also struggles

with the question of what part of man bears this similarity
with God.

This latter question is the crucial anthropo-

logical point in Origen's interpretation of the creation of

man stories.

Origen tries to go beyond the content of the

similarity between God and man to determine what aspect of
man's nature is essentially divine.

Of the three aspects of

the God-man relationship which arise in Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-30,

this topic occurs most often, and

receives the greatest amount of attention.

The importance

which this topic has in Origen's interpretation of Gen 1:26-
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30 indicates that Origen finds this text a major source of
information (or at least, of confirmation) for his theological anthropology.
Each of these problematic aspects,

and the various

ways Origen deals with them in his primary interpretations
of Gen 1:26-30, will be examined in turn.

Where Origen's

interpretations differ in regard to each of these aspects,
we will take careful note of the context of the various
interpretations, and attempt to locate the reason for the
variation.

The first issue to be discussed is that of the

nature of the similarity between God and man.

A.

The "Likeness" and the "Image" of God
Origen's first step in describing the nature of

the similarity between God and man in his first Homily on
Genesis is to make a distinction between the "image" of God,
and the "likeness" of God mentioned in Gen 1:26.

As Origen

presents it in this homily, the image of God is the Savior,
the model or prototype according to which the inner man is
made;

the "likeness" simply refers to how the inner man is

made according to the model.

The sense is that Gen 1:26

simply means "let us make man like the Savior, who is the
image of God."
Origen continues to be concerned about the distinction between the image and the likeness mentioned in Gen
1:26, but the interpretation of this distinction varies.
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At one point in De Principiis, Origen seems to think this
distinction is a deliberate discrepancy in the scriptural
text.

While Gen 1:26 records God saying "Let us make man

according to our own image and likeness," Gen 1:27 describes
God as having made man "according to the image of God."
The making of man according to God's likeness has not been
recorded by Scripture,

although Scripture "promises" it.

Origen takes this to mean that being made according to God's
this will be culmination of man's

likeness is a prophecy:
existence.

The image of God has been given to the inner man

from his first

creation,

but the likeness of God will be

given to man as the reward and goal of achieving perfection.
Origen construes "likeness" in this case as referring to
something like an "image"--that is, a degree of similarity-but a greater, more perfect similarity than an "image."

The

more perfect similarity is the end product of a perfected
life.16
Origen draws this same distinction between the "image" and the "likeness" of God in Contra Celsum, but he
is more specific about what constitutes a perfected life in
this later work.

Being made in the likeness of God is the

result of leading a virtuous life; being made in God's image
is something inherent to the human individual.17

The point

of this citation in Origen's argument is that Christians do
not believe that man,
every way like God.

as he exists in this world,

is in

Such perfect similitude with God be-
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longs only to the perfected soul.

The image of God, which

Christians believe every man to possess, does not involve
such perfect similitude.lB
Origen's distinction between the image of God which
all living men possess, and the likeness to God which is the
destiny of the perfect man,

indicates that the similarity

between God and man which is due to man being made according to the image of God is not a complete similarity.

By

making this distinction, Origen places the living man at a
distance from God in order to emphasize the closer similarity of the perfected man with God.
Origen also stresses the difference between the
living man and God when he discusses why Scripture describes

man as being made according to the image of God, and not as
an image of God.
Genesis,
God,

As we have seen in his first Homily on

Origen tends to identify the Savior,

as the image of God.

image.

the Word of

Man is made according to this

Therefore, man is not himself the image of God.

The

implication of this interpretation in regard to the relationship between man and the Logos will be discussed below.
But this interpretation also has implications regarding the
nature of the similarity between God the Father and man.
Origen uses this text to stress both the relationship of man
to the Logos, and also to emphasize that man is not similar
to God in esssence.

In Contra Celsum, this latter emphasis

is more prominent, because Origen is attempting to discredit

51

celsus'

criticism of Christianity's high regard for man.

The occurrence of this same theme in other, less polemical,
works indicates that Origen continues to insist on maintaining a distinction between the nature of God and human nature.l9

But Contra Celsum contains the most explicit de-

scription of the difference.

As mentioned above, the simi-

larity between God and man is related to the possession and
exercise of virtue.

Origen interprets the fact that man has

been made according to the image of God, and not made
image of God,

an

to indicate that while God possesses virtue

by his very nature,
of God.20

~

man possesses virtue only in imitation

Being made according to God's image ensures man

of the capacity for virtue; the actual acquisition and exercise of virtue is not, however, guaranteed in man's nature.
In a fragment of a lost work of Origen, the exercise
of virtue is once again related to the phrase "the image of
God."

In this work, Origen uses this phrase to refer to the

similarity between God and man.

Man's capacity for virtue

is the element in man's existence which is Godlike.

God has

made man like himself in order to enable man to act virtuously.

The capacity for virtue exists in man so that man

will act virtuously and become even more Godlike.21
again,

once

the ability to act virtuously is part of the nature

God has given to man.

But the actual exercise of virtue is

left for man to achieve on his own.
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B.

Man's Relationship to the Logos
Although Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-30

which have been examined have tended to stress the distance
between God the Father and man,

these interpretations have

also emphasized the special relationship which exists between the Word of God and man.

Origen habitually identi-

fies the Logos as the image of God, according to which man
is made.22

This identification is natural,

since Origen

links the term "image of God" found in Genesis with Paul's
assertion that the Christ is "the image of the invisible
God."23
Origen explicitly forges this link in De Principiis,
as he attempts to explain the relationship between God the
Father and the Logos.

Origen explains that the word "image"

has two distinct meanings in Scripture.

"Image" may mean an

object which has been crafted in such a way that it resembles the original model.

Origen maintains that this is the

sense in which Gen 1:26-27 uses the term "image."

On the

other hand, the term may be applied to a child who possesses
the same features and characteristics of his parents.

The

latter usage implies a unity of nature and substance between
the image and the model according to which the image is
formed.

This is the sense the word image is used in Colos-

sians.

But in regard to Gen 1:26-27, Origen implies that

man does not share essentially in God's nature or substance.
Origen describes the similarity to God found in man as a
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crafted similarity, not an essential one.24
In this passage,

Origen maintains that the Logos

possesses an essential similarity with God the Father.

The

relationship between the Logos and man is not discussed
explicitly, but clearly the Logos possesses essentially what
man possesses only derivatively.

In this context, the Logos

seems to be a model according to which man is created,

just

as Origen has asserted in his first Homily on Genesis.
But in a later homily on Genesis,

the relationship

between man and the Logos is interpreted differently.

In

his thirteenth Homily on Genesis, Origen describes the Logos
as the craftsman who creates the similarity to God,
image of God which is in man.

the

The ambiguity which appears

in Origen's first Homily on Genesis reappears here:

the

Logos is both the model for, and the agent who produces, the
image of God in man.25
A passage in Origen's Commentary on the Song of
Songs also indicates that being made in the image of God
implies a specific sort of relationship with the Logos, and
this relationship influences the course of man's salvation.
Since the soul has been created in the image of God,

the

soul receives its beauty by coming to the Word of God.26
The relationship between the Logos and man in this instance
is primarily that of a model to copy, but includes aspects
of the Platonic theory of participation.

Origen implies

that by turning towards the Logos, man can come to share in

54

some quality of the Logos.
the activity of man,

This interpretation emphasizes

i.e.,

turning towards the Logos,

but

the concept of a "copy" participating in its archetype, and
thus sharing in some characteristics of the archetype has
exerted an influence.
In his

Commentar~

on the Gospel of John,

Origen

tries to clarify what the image of God in man is, and how
man is related to the Logos.

The context for Origen's re-

marks is his argument advocating the acceptance of a modified

"Euhemerism"--the idea that individuals may be "dei-

fied."

Origen seems to assert that this can actually occur,

but that it is the result of the one,
divinity upon worthy individuals. 27
stowing divinity"
God.

true God bestowing

This process of "be-

takes place in relation to the Word of

The Word of God is the divinity of those who are made

gods by the one God.

Bestowing divinity means that God

forms the "gods," in some way using himself as a model, and
thus allows these "gods" to share in his divine essence.
But the actual archetype for these images of God is the Word
of God.

To clarify the situation, Origen proposes a series

of proportions.

The faculty of reason in rational creatures

is related to the Logos, just as the Logos is related to God
the Father.

Thus,

just as the Logos is the image of God,

reason in the human individual is the image of the Logos.28
In his Commentary on the Gospel of John, Origen once
again stresses that the Logos is the model for the divine
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quality in man.

But the proportions which he constructs

also imply some sort of agency on the part of the Logos in
establishing this divine quality in man.

This work con-

tains another example of Origen's tendency to describe the
relationship between the Logos and man as the relationship
between a Platonic model or archetype, and a copy.

Both

similarity and derivation are aspects of this relationship.

c.

The Divine Aspect of Man
The final ambiguity in reference to the general

relationship between God and man which Origen finds in Gen
1:26-30, and which he frequently addresses in his interpretations of this passage, is the question of what part of
man is the locus for the similarity between God and man.
Origen's answer to this question varies in detail in his
different interpretations, but Origen maintains one overriding point with great consistency.

The inner,

spiritual

man is that aspect of the human individual who has been
made according to the image of God.

The corporeal aspect

of the human individual is repeatedly excluded from sharing
in the image of God.

But there is some variation in the way

Origen identifies what part of the inner man does share in
this image.
In his first Homily on Genesis, Origen asserts that
the spirit is the aspect of the human individual which carries a likeness to God, since only this aspect of the human
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individual is immortal and incorruptible,
immortal and incorruptible.

just as God is

In other interpretations of

Genesis, Origen supposes that the virtues are the content
of the similarity between God and man.

This supposition

influences Origen's proof that the inner man is the bearer
of God's image in Contra Celsum.

Here, Origen proves this

assertion by eliminating the alternatives.

Origen assumes

that the human creature is made up of two parts:

a body,

and "the inner man," which seems to mean the soul.
body is the part which is made in God's image,

If the
then the

superior part of the human, the soul, is not made in God's
image.

In that case,

the part of man made in God's image

would be ruled by a part which is not in God's image, which
is absurd.

If both body and soul are that which has been

made in God's image,

then God must be a composite being,

since a creature made according to his image is composite.
This would imply that God had parts of varying degrees of
superiority and inferiority;

this is also absurd.

There-

fore, it must be the soul, or the inner man, which has been
made in God's image:

there is no other alternative.29

But in this same section of Contra Celsum, Origen
also argues that the part of man which is made in the image
of God is that part which has never had, or no longer has,
anything to do with the "old man."
reference to sinful man,

Clearly,

the "old Adam."

this is a

Origen's point

seems to be that the part of man made in God's image cannot
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have any necessary or inevitable connection with the sinful life:

if it has been in contact with sin, this contact

is unnatural to it.

But by implication,

the parts of man

which have not been made in the image of God do have some
sort of inevitable connection with the sinful life.

Since

the inner, spiritual man is the only part which is free of
a more or less necessary connection with sin, it is the part
of man which has been made in God's image.
A shift has occurred in Origen's understanding of
the content of the similarity between God and man.

In his

first Homily on Genesis, Origen states that God and man are
similar in that both are immortal, invisible and incorruptible.

In Contra Celsum, Origen believes that God and man

are similar in that both are free from a necessary connection with sin,
virtue.

and are therefore capable of maintaining

In both cases,

a key aspect of the similarity be-

tween God and man is stability or permanence.
similarity is thought of as immortality,
istence of God and man is stressed.

When the

the permanent ex-

When the content of

the similarity is thought of as virtue, Origen's discussion
dwells on the fact that both God and man (or at least that
part of man whi,ch is similar to God) are capable of maintaining virtue within themselves.

Therefore, Origen implies

that the similarity between God and man must itself exist in
some permanent way.

The image of God within man is stable

and permanent because God himself is unchanging.

The aspect
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of man which possesses the image of God must also be permanent and enduring, or else it would not be able to possess
this image.
The stability of the image of God in man is once
again a primary issue in his thirteenth Homily on Genesis.
once again, Origen stresses that it is the inner man who has
been made in God's image, but he points out that this image
cannot be "seen" when this inner man is "dirty," that is,
when the inner man has assumed the image of earthliness,
carnality.

But the obscured image of God is not lost by

this assumption of a contrary image.

The image of God al-

ways remains in man, even if an earthly image is drawn over
it.30
But in other passages in which Origen interprets
Gen 1:26-30,

the damage which sin does to the image of God

in man seems to go beyond obscuring this image.

Origen's

seventh Homily on Ezekiel describes the damage done to the
inner man by inappropriate love as affecting the soul's
"spirit-sense."

Sinners fall in love with the soul in an

inappropriate fashion, thus committing "spiritual impurity."
This spiritual impurity injures the soul:
sense"

is corrupted.

its "spirit-

At this point then,

the spiritual

sense of the soul, that aspect of the inner man which contains the image of God, is corrupted.31
The confusion concerning the stability of the divine
aspect of man is related to Origen's inconsistency in iden-
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tifying what aspect of man is divine, i.e., capable of bearing the image of God.

Where the image of God in man is

described as permanent and enduring, Origen tends to speak
of the spirit of man as possessing the image of God.32
in other interpretations,

But

the broader term "inner man" is

used to identify the locus of the image of God.33
Origen presents us with a third alternative.

In

his Exhortation to Martyrdom, Origen identifies the soul as
being that which is made according to the image of God.
This is the reason why the soul is more precious than the
body.34

This may be an instance where Origen is speaking

loosely of the inner man as being simply the soul,
than both the soul and the spirit.

rather

If this is the case,

the interpretations where Origen identifies the soul as the
bearer of God's image differ from other interpretations
where the spirit bears this image in that the former interpretations rely upon a bi-level anthropology, and the latter
interpretations rely upon a tri-level anthropology.

This

same passage from the Exhortation to Martyrdom does include
an implication that the soul can become something better
than a soul--ie., a spirit--by suffering martyrdom.
fore,

There-

this passage seems to imply a modified tri-level an-

thropology.

The soul is the condition of the spirit, where

the spirit belongs to a living human being.

In terms of the

individual's present condition, there are two levels within
the individual:

the body and the soul,

the outer man and
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But in terms of the individual's future,

the inner man.

the soul is to be liberated from the flesh and become a
spirit once again.35
If this is how Origen's understands the human condition, then the variation in his interpretations of Gen 1:2630 is understandable.

The "inner man," the spirit, and the

soul all refer to the same entity, the spiritual aspect of
man.

Origen distinguishes between them in an attempt to

communicate the difference between the spiritual capacity of
the living man,
man.

and the spiritual capacity of the perfect

When Origen speaks of the image of God residing in the

spirit of man, his attention is focused on the final, perfeet end of man's existence.

When the soul is thought to

bear the image of God, Origen emphasizes man's capacity to
achieve this end.
In addition,

the question of the corruptibility of

the divine aspect of the human individual is somewhat clarified.

The spirit itself is corruptible only insofar as it

has become a soul, and may stay a soul for some time.

But

if the individual becomes enamoured of his current condition
(thus falling in love with the soul), the influence of the
soul's prior,

strictly spiritual state will fade,

and the

return to this state will be hindered.

III.

The Second Story of the Creation of Man:
Gen 2:4-9
In his first Homily on Genesis, Origen only briefly
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refers to the second story of the creation of man in Gen
2:4-9.

This second creation story receives much less atten-

tion than the first story of the creation of man in
1:26-30 in all of Origen's writings.

Gen

When Origen does in-

terpret the second story of the creation of man,

the re-

sults are in many ways the same as when he interprets the
first story.

His interpretations of Gen 2:4-9 vary depend-

ing upon the context in which the interpretations occur.
Certain characteristics of Origen's theological anthropology
appear in his interpretations of both stories.
less,

Neverthe-

Origen's interpretations of Gen 2:4-9 tend to deal

with certain aspects of the human person which are not dealt
with in his interpretations of Gen 1:26-30; other aspects
of the human person are described differently.

The most

important aspect of Origen's interpretation of this second
creation story is his discussion of the corporeality of
human existence.
As mentioned briefly above,

Origen identifies the

second creation of man story found in Gen 2:4-9 as a description of the corporeal creation of man in his first
Homily on Genesis.36

This corporeal creation is not exam-

ined in any detail in this homily.

Corporeality is not

a primary concern in Origen's analysis of the human person.
The primary concern of this homily is the discussion of
man's moral obligations; Origen does not consider corporeality to be an important factor in this determination.

Since
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man's essence is spirit, man's primary duty is to the spiritual realm.
In the Prologue to his Commentary on the Song of
Songs, Origen presents his most extensive interpretation of
Gen 2:4-9.

In this interpretation, Origen explicitly states

that the two creation stories, Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9,
refer to the creation of two "different" men.

Gen 1:26-30

describes the creation of the inner man according to the
image and likeness of God; Gen 2:4-9 describes the creation
of the outer man,

formed from the dust of the earth.

inner man is spiritual; the outer man is corporeal.
Origen's references to Paul make clear,

The

But as

Origen actually

thinks these creation stories describe the origins and characteristics of two aspects of the human individual,
than two types of men.

rather

Origen refers to Paul's statement

that every person is made up of two different men, the inner
man and the outer man.

Each aspect has been created apart

from the other, but is currently found in every human 1ndividual.37

Origen does not explicitly describe the manner in

which these two distinct aspects have been united, nor the
reason for this union.

But since the outer man is explicit-

ly identified as having been "formed from the dust of the
earth," it is reasonable to suppose that Origen understands
"God breathing into the face" of the corporeal man as the
means by which God unites the inner and the outer man.
But even though Origen stresses the distinction
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between the inner and outer man, which are united to form a
given human individual, this is not the primary focus of his
interpretation in the Prologue to his Commentary on the Song
of Songs.

Origen is more concerned with discussing the

similarities between the two distinct aspects of the human
individual which Scripture identifies as the inner and outer
man.

These similarities are extensive enough that Origen

feels

justified in using a common vocabulary in regard to

each one.
Both the inner, spiritual man and the outer, corporeal man have "ages";

both the spirit and the body tend

to develop in some kind of predictable pattern.
more,

Further-

both the inner man and the outer man can love.

The

corporeal aspect of man is capable of loving, and this love
may be appropriate or inappropriate.

In the same way, the

spiritual aspect of man is capable of a different type of
love--a spiritual love--and this type of love also may be
appropriate or inappropriate.
propriate to the inner,

The exploration of love ap-

spiritual man is the subject of

Origen's Commentary on the Song of Songs.
In this interpretation of Gen 2:4-9, Origen argues
that knowledge of the inner, spiritual man can be obtained
by observing specific characteristics of the outer, corporeal man because the inner man shares some of these characteristics,

albeit in a spiritual manner.

Origen argues that

although the love proper to the corporeal aspect of the
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individual may be a rival or alternative to the love appropriate to the spiritual aspect, this is not the only way for
an individual to love inappropriately.

Spiritual love it-

self may be appropriate or inappropriate.

Origen maintains

that by observing the rules which govern corporeal love, we
learn about what is appropriate and inappropriate in spiritual love.

Within the context of this argument, Origen's

distinction between the spiritual and corporeal aspects of
human existence does not emphasize the antagonism between
the two;

on the contrary,

the similarities between the two

aspects are emphasized.38
In the Prologue to his Commentary on the Song of
Songs, Origen interprets the second story of the creation of
man as referring to the creation of the corporeal aspect of
the human individual.

It is no surprise,

therefore,

that

the first clause of Gen 2:7 receives the most attention in
this interpretation.

Origen considers the fact that "the

Lord God formed man of dust from the ground" as a clear
indication that the corporeal creation of man is being discussed,

as opposed to the earlier spiritual creation of

man described in Gen 1:26-30.

As we have seen in our analy-

sis of his first Homily on Genesis,

Origen believes all

scriptural references to the earth and ground are to be
understood as allegorical references to man's body.
But in Contra Celsum and De Principiis, when Origen
interprets the second story of the creation of man, he fo-
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cuses upon the rest of Gen 2:7.

The emphasis on the forma-

tion of man from the dust of the ground disappears.

The

fact that God "breathed into his nostrils the breath of
life;

and man became a

living being., becomes the primary

issue with which Origen is concerned.
In Contra Celsum,

Origen states that when God

breathed into the face of the man formed from the dust (that
is,

the outer,

corporeal aspect of man),

God

share of his incorruptible spirit to man."39

11

imparted a

Origen argues

that this verse indicates that there is indeed an immortal
and divine aspect of human existence.

But in the course of

this argument, Origen implies that the animating principle
of man, that which makes man a living being, is this divine
aspect.

The spirit of man, which is itself a share of God's

own spirit,

is the animating principle of the human body.

In this interpretation, Origen abandons his more usual tripartite anthropology in favor of a strictly dualistic anthropology.

The spirit of man is invested with the function

of the soul, as that which makes man alive.

The fact that

man is alive is taken as an indication that every man has a
share in God's spirit.
In De Principiis, Origen presents a similar interpretation of Gen 2:7 as one possibility.

Origen suggests

that the breath of life might be understood as the gift of
life, which God has given to all men.
tion is accepted,

If this interpreta-

Gen 2:7 indicates that every man has a
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share in God.

But in presenting this possibility, Origen

does not identify this "share'' in God as part of God's spirit.

If the breath of God is to be understood as the spirit

of God, i.e. the Holy Spirit, then Origen suggests that this
verse figuratively describes the inspiration of the prophets,

and the writers and interpreters of Scripture.

this case,

In

Gen 2:7b simply indicates that God's spirit is

given to the saints;

the topic of the creation of man has

disappeared.40

IV.

Conclusion
This analysis of Origen's interpretations has been

organized under the rubric of three anthropological questions which Origen addresses

in these interpretations.

While Origen does not answer these questions in the same way
in every case, some kind of pattern may be discerned in his
various responses.
In his attempt to specify the content of the similarity between God and man, his attempt to discern how much
and in what way man is similar to God, Origen adopts one of
two strategies.

He either emphasizes a distinction between

the image of God

(which man currently possesses) and the

likeness of God (which man will possess when he is perfect);
or he emphasizes that man is made according to the image of
God and not as an image of God.

In both cases, Origen wants

to stress that the current similarity between God and man is
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limited.

In the latter case, the distinction between being

made according to the image of God and not as an image of
God is made with the intent of avoiding an anthropomorphic
idea of God; Origen wants to refute Celsus' accusation that
Christians present a negative view of the divine since they
consider man to be "just like God."

In the former case,

Origen distinguishes between the limited similarity with God
which man currently possesses (the "image" of God) and the
far greater similarity with God which the perfected man will
possess (the "likeness'' of God).
of Origen 1 s

In both cases, the result

interpretations stress a distance between God

and man as he currently exists.
The second anthropological aspect found in Origen's
interpretations of the creation of man stories reemphasizes
the distance between God and man.

Origen describes the

Logos as the intermediary between God and man.
the

Logos acts as

formed.

Most often,

the model after which man has been

The Logos is himself the image of God, according to

which man has been made.

But frequently Origen describes

the Logos as a more active intermediary between God and
man:

the Logos is the craftsman who establishes and renews

the similarity between God and man.
The distance between God and man is accented by the
mediation of the Logos in both cases.

In conceiving the

kogos as the model for man, Origen implies that man is not
directly similar to God, but to the Logos.

Man's similarity
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to God is proportional to the similarity of the Logos to
God.

In conceiving the Logos as the craftsman of the simi-

larity between God and man,

Origen stresses the fact that

this similarity is derivative.

Man possesses a crafted

similarity with God, such as the similarity between a portrait and the individual which the portrait depicts, rather
than similarity in substance and essences, such as the similarity between a child and his parents.
But even as he tends to emphasize the distance between God and man,

Origen insists that man does possess

some kind of divine nature.

He attempts to identify exactly

what part of man's nature is divine.

The corporeal, carnal

aspect of man is repeatedly dismissed from consideration,
since God cannot be considered corporeal.

But although

Origen consistently identifies the "inner man" as the locus
of the divine nature in man, he is not consistent in his
more precise terminology.

Usually, the spirit is the aspect

of man which carries within it similarity with God; sometimes the soul bears this honor.
This

inconsistency may simply be symptomatic of

Origen's tendency to describe existence as having three
levels,

while implicitly using a

dualistic world view.

Origen's distinction between body, soul and spirit is made
within a Platonic understanding of reality, which distinguishes between the sensible and the ideal planes of existence.

Before the implications which this tri-level/bi-level
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theory has for Origen's interpretations of the creation of
man stories,

and for his theological anthropology, can be

examined, we must first identify the sources of and influences upon Origen's interpretations.

CHAPTER III
THE SOURCES OF ORIGEN 1 S INTERPRETATIONS
The analysis of Origen•s interpretation of Gen 1:2627 and Gen 2:6-7 in the previous chapter has provided the
bulk of raw material which we will need to explore the theological anthropology, and its correlative soteriology, which
Origen finds implicit in these creation of man stories.

But

before we can proceed with this exploration, our analysis of
Origen•s own interpretations must be augmented by an analysis of the various influences on Origen•s interpretations of
Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7.
As we examine the various influences which help
shape Origen•s interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7,
we will obtain valuable, and sometimes vital,
which will assist our understanding of Origen.

information
By identify-

ing the traditional elements in Origen•s interpretations,

the elements which Origen has taken up from the biblical
exegetes who preceded him, we will be able to see the unique
aspects of Origen•s work.

This contrast will be heightened

by noticing what traditional elements Origen omits from his
interpretations,

and what traditional interpretations he

feels obliged to refute.
A second benefit of analyzing the influences upon
Origen•s interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 also
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involves contrast.
brings a

The inclusion of traditional elements

tone and perspective into Origen's work which is

distinct from Origen's own.

By identifying the occasions

when Origen uses another exegete's work, we will be able to
account for different nuances within Origen's writing without losing sight of Origen's own position.
Finally, Origen's interpretations sometimes include
the assumption that his audience is as familiar with his
predecessors as he is.

At such times, Origen's interpreta-

tions may seem inconsistent or inexplicable because he fails
to include all of the logical connections found in these
sources; he simply uses their conclusions.

In these cases,

an understanding of Origen's sources is essential for understanding Origen.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to catalog and
analyze all the various strands of tradition which Origen
employs in his exegetical work, and all the influences which
help shape his interpretations.

This chapter will focus on

the specific influences which affect Origen's interpretations of the two stories of the creation of man, and which
can shed light on the theological anthropology that Origen
discovers within these passages of Scripture.

Therefore,

this chapter will examine the influence which Clement of
Alexandria and Philo of Alexandria have had on Origen's
interpretation of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7.
Evidence exists which establishes that each of these
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exegetes has influenced Origen's interpretation of the creation of man stories.

Each of these exegetes has written

a significant body of work, from which their own philosophical predispositions and theological positions can be determined.

Therefore,

it will be

possib~e

to explore both the

exegetical traditions which Origen adopts from these two
authors, and their philosophical and theological presuppositions which he inherits, and sometimes adapts.

From this,

we may obtain a clearer understanding of Origen's own philosophical understanding and theological agenda.
Special attention will be paid to the influence
which Philo of Alexandria has had on Origen's interpretations of the two creation of man

stor~es.

Philo's influence

on Origen seems to have been especially extensive.
and Origen share a

common

philosoph~cal

orientation.

Philo
But

more importantly, each of these interpreters of Scripture
works from a different theological

tradition.

Therefore,

even though they both interpret the same Scripture, and use
similar vocabulary and philosophical categories in describing the theological anthropology they find implicit in the
two stories of the creation of man,

they necessarily differ

in the content of that theological anthropology.

By identi-

fying and examining the adjustments which Origen makes to
Philo's interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, and
where Origen departs from Philo's interpretations altogether, we may be able to discern the aspects of Origen's theo-
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logical anthropology which are specifically related to his
understanding of the Incarnation and Christian soteriology.
This chapter will begin with an examination of the
influence which Clement of Alexandria's interpretations of
Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 has had on Origen•s interpretations.

Clement shares Origen•s cultural and philosophical

milieu,

and Origen•s Christian theological orientation.

Clement also has been influenced by Philo, and it is possible that some of Philo's influence on Origen has been communicated--and thus affected--by Clement.1

But the largest

part of this chapter will discuss the influence of Philo on
Origen•s interpretation of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7.

This

discussion will begin with an examination of the specific
Philonic interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 which
appear in Origen's exegesis of the two creation of man stories.

Then Origen•s implicit use of Philonic interpreta-

tions will be examined in an effort to resolve certain inconsistencies in Origen's interpretations.

Finally,

the

differences between the interpretations of Origen and Philo
will be identified.

I.

The Influence of Clement of Alexandria
As soon as we begin to investigate the influence

which Clement of Alexandria has had on Origen, we become
involved

in controversy.

Some scholars,

Eusebius•

account of Origen•s life,

relying upon

assume that Clement
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actually instructed Origen.2

But F. L. cross doubts whether

origen has been influenced at all by Clement.3

Many modern

scholars concede that while there is no evidence that Origen
had been taught by Clement, there is sufficient evidence to
suppose that Origen has been influenced by Clement's work.4
The extent of this influence is still disputed.
Fortunately,

this thesis does not depend upon a

resolution of this question.

We do not need to predetermine

the degree to which Clement has influenced Origen.

Our task

is to identify the instances where Clement interprets Gen

1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, and determine if Origen uses these
interpretations in his exegesis of the stories of man's
creation and his theological speculations which arise from
his exegesis.

We may assume that Origen has some degree of

familiarity with Clement's work,

but we must also examine

the relevant passages of Clement and Origen to determine how
much this familiarity has influenced Origen's interpretation
of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7.5
When Clement interprets Gen 1:26-27, he usually is
concerned with discussing the moral obligation man has to
imitate God.

He often connects this discussion of the imi-

tation of God with passages from the Greek philosophers
which describe likeness with God in terms of justice, wisdom
and virtue.6

Clement has been heavily influenced by, and

often employs, the Platonic understanding of "likeness" to
God as the essence of a virtuous and happy life.

Clement
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tends to interpret the statement that man has been made
according to the image and likeness of God as a moral directive

(e.g. ,

• man should act in imitation of God •)

than as an anthropological description (e.g.,

rather

•man is simi-

lar to God').
The emphasis upon the moral obligation imposed upon
man is Gen 1:26-27 is also reflected in Clement's distinction between the

11

imagen and the

which man is created.
what is

11

11

likeness 11 according to

Like Origen, Clement also states that

according to the imagen has been given to man at

man's creation,

but what is

11

according to the likeness .. is

to be given as a result or reward of man•s living a virtuous
life· 7
11

This particular distinction between

likeness,

11

11

11

image" and

image 11 being part of man's original and present

condition and "likeness .. being the future condition of the
man who has led a virtuous life, fits in well with Clement's
emphasis upon the moral implications of Gen 1:26-27.
describing the

11

likeness 11 of God as man's

~erfected

By

state,

Clement is able to describe and encourage the specific attitudes and actions which bring man to this perfected state.
But Clement uses the distinction between
ent condition and "likeness .. as a
once.

11

image 11 as a pres-

future condition only

He makes other distinctions between the image and

likeness of God alluded to in Gen 1:26-27 to describe the
moral directives implicit in this creation story.S
C1 em en t

combines his understanding that the

11

image

76

of God" which man possesses is not identical with the "likeness of God" with a discussion of man's relationship with
the Logos.

Clement makes the traditional exegetical move of

identifying the true image of God as the Logos, and asserts
that man is modeled after the Logos.9
passages,

But in two separate

Clement makes this move in connection with an

explicit distinction between the "image of God" and the
"likeness of God."

When this occurs, his tendency to inter-

pret man's similarity to God as a moral dictum rather than
an anthropological datum is again prominent.
In the first of these passages

(Strom. V,14),

the

combination of these two exegetical positions is straightforward.

The "image of God" refers to the Logos, therefore

man (specifically, man's mind) is the image of God's Image.
But the "likeness" which man possesses is defined as a "divine correspondence."

To explain what this "divine corre-

spondence" is, Clement adduces scriptural passages describing man's obligation of obedience to God.

The "likeness of

God" which man possesses is therefore explained in terms of
the imitation of God, but not in reference to man's perfected state.

The distinction between the image and the like-

ness to God which are in man is no longer a distinction
based on man's current state versus his future,
condition.

perfected

Instead, this distinction is between the "image"

as referring to a

condition of man (being a copy of the

Image of God), and the "likeness" which refers to an activi-
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ty required of man (the imitation of God).lO
The second combination of the concept of the "image
of God" as referring to the Logos, and the distinction between the "image of God"
is somewhat less clear.

in man and the "likeness of God"
In The Paedagogue, Clement identi-

fies Christ (the Logos) as the maker and instructor of man,
and as the one who effects man's salvation through his coming.

Christ forms man from the dust, then regenerates man,

gives him growth by water and the spirit, and trains man to
salvation.

In this way, Christ transforms the earth-born

man into a heavenly being.

In being formed from the dust,

man has been created according to Christ's image.
Christ's subsequent activity--the regeneration,

But

growth and

training of man--fulfills the Scripture "Let us make man
according to our own image and likeness."ll
Here again,
of man;

"likeness 11

"image" refers to the created condition
is the result of Christ's saving work.

The image of God is bestowed upon all men by-Christ when he
creates them; the likeness of God is the result of Christ's
example, his "training of man to salvation."

Thus,

the

likeness of God comes after the image of God in temporal
terms,

but in this interpretation,

it is not directly or

exclusively the result of man's virtuous activity.

Christ's

activity is the central point of this interpretation.
In this

interpretation of Gen 1:26-27,

stresses the active role of Christ,

the Logos,

Clement
in man's
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re-creation,

i.e.,

salvation.

This emphasis is combined

with the concept of man being modeled after Christ, who is
himself the Image of God.

Here Clement shares Origen's

concept of the Logos as both the model of man's creation,
and the agent who effects man's creation.12
Clement also includes a specific identification of
the aspect of man which has been made according to God's
image in some of his interpretations of Gen 1:26-27.
aspect is consistently identified as the mind,
tional aspect of man.13

This

or the ra-

Since he identifies the mind as

the divine aspect of man, Clement ascribes the title "Son
of Mind"

to the Logos,

rationality

is

the

after whom man is modeled.

Man's

result of man's similarity to the

Logos.14
The divinity of the rational aspect of man is also
the main point of Clement's interpretations of Gen 2:6-7.
Clement interprets these verses to show the dignity of man
as a whole,15 but he often emphasizes the surpassing dignity
of the part of man which God breathed into man's face.16
Clement identifies this part as the rational soul.17
Every time Clement interprets Gen 2:6-7, he includes
an interpretation of Gen 1:26-27, which identifies the rational soul as the divine aspect of man.

As Clement under-

stands these two stories of the creation of man, each one is
primarily concerned with the nature and proper activity of
the rational aspect of man.18

Clement makes very little
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distinction between the two stories; both deal primarily
with the mind of man.

Clement does not encounter any diffi-

culty in interpreting Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 as different
accounts of the same event.

Clement never indicates that

Gen 1:26-27 deals with an ideal or incorporeal creation
while Gen 2:6-7 describes a corporeal creation.
At this point, Clement's interpretation of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 differs sharply from Origen•s.

Origen

insists on a sharp distinction between the two creation of
man stories.

Origen understands these two stories as de-

scribing two distinct events:

the creation of

man 11 and the creation of "the outer man.

11

11

the inner

This understand-

ing causes Origen to de-emphasize Gen 2:6-7, which he understands as describing the corporeal creation of man.

But

when he does refer to Gen 2:6-7, the corporeal aspect of
man is acknowledged.

Clement understands both stories as

referring primarily to man's inner, intellectual nature.
From this brief survey of Clement•s·interpretations
of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, we can identify other elements
which also appear in Origen•s interpretation of these passages.

First of all,

the distinction between the image

of God and the likeness of God which man possesses is prominent in both authors•

work.

But the precise distinction

which is important to Origen•s interpretation, the identification of the image of God as a current possession of man
and the likeness of God as a future result of living a vir-
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tuous life, appears only once in Clement.

Clement has dif-

ferent ways of dealing with the difference between
and

11

likeness,

11

11

image 11

combining this distinction with his under-

standing of the Logos as the image of God.
This identification of the Logos as the image of
God, and thus the model for the creation of man, is a second
common point between Clement and Origen.

At the same time,

both authors agree that the Logos is also an active agent in
the creation of man.

This double concept of the Logos as

the model and the agent of man's creation arises from a
common philosophical perspective which both Clement and
Origen share with Philo,

and will be discussed in the last

section of this chapter.
A third characteristic common to Clement and Origen
is that both authors link the role which the Logos plays in
the creation of man with the role of the Logos in the salvation of man.

For Origen, this link is made in reference to

the fact that man has been made according to the image of
the Logos.

Since man has been made similar to the Logos,

the salvation of man is related to the re-establishment of
this similarity.

The Logos accomplishes this by assuming

human nature.l9
But Clement links the role of the Logos in the first
creation story of man even more closely to the role of the
Logos in man's salvation.

He interprets the first creation

story as containing a prophetic, allegorical description of
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the salvation of man.20

The activity of the Logos in the

creation and salvation of man has a

special place in

Clement's interpretation of Gen 1:26-27.

The Logos brings

about the salvation of man by training and enlightening
man.

Thus, Clement interprets Gen 1:26-27 in such a way to

highlight the didactic element in the salvific activity of
the Logos.
Origen, on the other hand, uses his own interpretation of Gen 1:26-27 to stress that man's salvation depends
upon the re-establishment of man's original similarity to
the Logos.

Undoubtably, a didactic element is a key part of

this process.

But Origen's imagery, which he develops in

his exegesis of Gen 1:26-27, tends to emphasize a change in
man's condition (as well as man's knowledge) as an important
aspect of the saving work of the Logos.
Finally, Clement consistently interprets Gen 1:26-27
and Gen 2:6-7 as indicating that man's mind or reason is the
aspect which is made according to the pattern of the Logos.
Origen usually identifies this aspect as the spirit, soul or
11

inner man.

11

While Origen is convinced that man's spirit

includes or involves man's rational nature,

he only infre-

quently identifies the spiritual aspect of man as the mind
(nous)

in his

2:6-7.21

interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen

Even though Clement and Origen share an under-

standing of the divine aspect of man as being the highest

•

aspect of man's nature,

reason,

their vocabularies in dis-
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cussing the divine aspect in man differ significantly.
From the above, we conclude that Clement and Origen
share general concepts which undergird their interpretations
of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7.

But these two authors rarely

deal with these texts in precisely the same way.

Clement is

oblivious to the exegetical problem which lies at the root
of Origen•s interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7;
Clement sees no need to interpret these texts as accounts of
different events.

He understands both creation of man sto-

ries as describing the intellectual, spiritual aspect of
man • s existence.

In this limited respect, Clement follows

Philo in identifying man•s mind as the
Origen,

11

true man. 11 22

in contrast with Clement,

draws a sharp

distinction between the two creation of man stories, believing them to be descriptions of two different events.

Origen

thinks that Gen 2:6-7 is an account of the creation of the
corporeal aspect of man,

while Gen 1:26-27- describes the

creation of man•s spiritual aspect.

Origen is careful to

distinguish between these two stories;

Clement shows a

strong tendency to conflate these two stories.

Clearly,

Clement does not have an extensive influence on the way
Origen interprets these texts.
Since both Clement and Origen deal with the same
texts, and since both share a similar philosophical perspective, some similarities in their interpretations are to be
expected.

In addition, both authors draw upon the same body
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of traditional exegesis to assist them in their interpretations.

But Clement and Origen treat these elements which

contribute to their interpretations in significantly different ways.

A comparison of the interpretations of Gen 1:26-

27 and Gen 2:6-7 found in Clement and Origen makes three
aspects of Origen's exegesis stand out in sharp relief.
First, Origen finds a sharp contrast between man as
he currently exists and man as he will exist in his perfected condition in Gen 1:26, when God says

11

according to our own image and likeness ...

Let us make man
The

11

image of

God 11 is bestowed upon man in creation, and is therefore an
intrinsic property of man.

The

11

likeness of God 11 is a more

perfect similarity to God, which is the result of a virtuous
life.

Clement perceives this contrast, but does not empha-

size it.
Secondly,

while Clement emphasizes the didactic

element of the saving work of the Logos, Origen includes an
additional

element

in his understanding of

this work.

Origen's primary conception of the saving work of the Logos
centers on the re-establishment of the original similarity
between the

Logos and man,

which is described in Gen

1:26-27.
Finally, Origen's insistence that the two creation
of man stories be treated as distinct events implies an
interest in (or at least an acknowledgement of) man's corporeal aspect which is entirely missing in Clement.

The only
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aspect of man which Clement sees emphasized in Gen 1:26-27
and Gen 2:6-7 is man's spiritual,

rational aspect.

Origen

understands these stories as describing both the spiritual
and corporeal aspects of man.
One traditional source which Clement and Origen
share is the exegetical work of Philo of Alexandria.

We

shall now turn to investigate Philo's interpretations of
Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7,

and to explore the influence

which these interpretations have had on Origen's exegesis
of the creation of man stories.

II.

The Influence of Philo of Alexandria
Origen cites Philo by name, so he must be aware of

Philo's work.23

There is no controversy in scholarly cir-

cles about whether Philo has influenced Origen.

Scholars

disagree about the extent and content of this influence, but
the fundamental question of the existence of this influence
is not in question.

For the purposes of this thesis, this

solid conclusion is comforting but insufficient.

The issue

which must be addressed here is whether, and to what degree,
Philo has influenced Origen's interpretation of Gen 1:26-27
and Gen 2:6-7,

and how Origen has adapted Philo's inter-

pretations.
The resolution of this issue makes three important
contributions to understanding Origen's exegesis of the
creation of man stories in Genesis.

The first advantage of
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a clear understanding of Philo's influence on Origen's interpretation of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 aay assist in
the

11

rehabilitation 11 of Origen as an orthodox Christian

theologian.

Critics (and admirers) of Origen have pointed

out that a good deal of Origen's soteriology relies upon a
non-incarnational Logos theology.24

This criticism accu-

rately notes the prominence of the Logos as an intermediary
between God and man in Origen's theological anthropology and
consequent soteriology.

But the role of Origen's inter-

pretation of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 in describing this
intermediary function of the Logos is often neglected.
As we shall see in the first part of this examination of Philo's influence on Origen, Origen draws heavily
from Philo's interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 to
develop his own Logos theology.

But when Origen uses

Philo's interpretations in his own work, he is using a nonChristian source.

This usage introduces an element which

has no necessary connection with Christian doctrine, especially the doctrine of the Incarnation, into Origen's interpretations.

By identifying the instances where Origen is

using Philonic interpretations, we will be able to identify
aspects of Origen's exegesis which are non-Christian.
The fact that Origen uses non-Christian elements to
interpret Scripture and discuss Christian doctrine is not
unorthodox or even unusual.

Unless Origen neglects to in-

elude specifically Christian concepts in his work,

the in-
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elusion of non-Christian concepts is not a flaw in his theological thought.

Later on in this chapter, we will see

that Origen does include specifically Christian, even specifically incarnational, aspects in his soteriology.
The second advantage of reading Philo to understand
Origen is that Philo sometimes clearly and explicitly establishes positions which Origen implicitly assumes.

We will

see that Origen is so familiar with Philo's work that he
assumes his audience possesses the same familiarity.
fore,

There-

Origen feels free to leave logical gaps in his own

writing when he thinks such gaps are adequately closed by
Philo.

This results in certain inconsistencies in Origen's

interpretations of Gen 1:26-21 and Gen 2:6-1.

An under-

standing of Philo resolves these inconsistencies into a
more coherent form.
Finally, a comparison of the interpretations of Gen
1:26-21 and Gen 2:6-1 found in Origen and Philo will identify the instances where Origen departs from Philo's positions.

Such a

comparison,

like the comparison of Origen

and Clement attempted above, will highlight the unique aspects of Origen•s interpretations of the creation of man
stories.

Even more importantly,

Origen•s adaptations of

Philo may be the result of Origen•s Christian perspective.
By identifying these adaptations, we will be able to see the
effect which Origen•s belief in the Incarnation has upon his
interpretations of Gen 1:26-21 and Gen 2:6-1, and the theo-
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logical anthropology which he derives from these interpretations.

A.

Origen's Use of Philonic Interpretations
As indicated above,

Origen develops a great part

of his Logos theology from his interpretations of Gen 1:2621.

Origen understands these verses to indicate that the

Logos is the image of God to which man has been made similar.

Philo has had a tremendous influence on Origen's in-

terpretations of Gen 1:26-21, especially in regards to this
identification of the Logos as the image of God.25
We have seen that in his first Homily on Genesis,
Origen makes this identification in the context of explaining why Scripture records God saying

11

Let us make man ac-

cording to our own image and likeness."

Origen infers from

this text that "likeness" and "image 11 are not synonyms;
Scripture does not contain idle repetitions.
identifies the

11

image of God 11 as the Logos; the

So Origen
11

likeness 11

is the similarity to the Logos which God creates in man.
This exposition is very similar to the one found in
Philo's De Opificio Mundi,
Philo also identifies the

11

11.

In this interpretation,

image of God 11 as the Logos, and

claims that Moses added the term "likeness 11 to indicate the
exact similarity to the Logos which is characteristic of
man.

Thus, Philo also interprets Gen 1:26-21 as indicating

that man has

been made as a

precise imitation of

the
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Logos.26
The extent of verbal agreement is significant in
this case.

While it is theoretically possible that Origen

may have reached the conclusion that the Logos is the image
of

God based on his

reading

of Paul's letter to the

Colossians,27 apart from Philo's influence,

the pattern of

Origen's argument is so similar to Philo's that some influence by Philo in this case must be acknowledged.

At the

very least, we may suppose that Origen uses a Philonic argument to support this identification.

It is more likely

that Origen finds the identification of the Logos as the
image of God in Philo, and uses it in his own exegesis to
draw Colossians and other Pauline texts into his interpretations of Gen 1:26-27.
In the course of adopting Philo's identification of
the Logos as his own, Origen also adopts Philo's tendency to
assert the significant difference between man and God which
is implicit in this identification.

Both Philo and Origen

are careful to insist that the similarity between God and
man is "at a third remove."

Man is not really similar to

God; man is similar to the Logos, who is similar to God.
The desire to assert and emphasize the distance
between God and man lies behind the similarity of Origen's
interpretation of Gen 1:26-27 found in Contra Celsum, and
Philo's interpretation of these verses in Heres. 231.28

In

both interpretations, the identification of the Logos as the
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image of God is followed by the conclusion that this is why
Scripture asserts that man is made according to the image of
God,

not as an image of God.

This interpretation of the

preposition kata is sufficiently specific and idiosyncratic
to infer that this is another case where Origen is explicitly adopting Philo•s argument.29
In the following chapter of this thesis, we will
need to remember that these two important concepts from
Origen•s interpretation of Gen 1:26-27--the identification
of the Logos as the image of God, and the peculiar interpretation of the preposition kata which emphasizes the distance between God and man--are derived from a non-Christian
source.

If Origen•s theological anthropology and consequent

soteriology are related to his interpretations of Gen 1:2627 and Gen 2:6-7, we should not be surprised if some aspects
of Origen•s anthropology and soteriology have a non-Christian character.

The aspects of Origen•s Logos theology

discussed above are Philonic rather than Christian.

B.

Origen and Implicit Philonic Interpretations
As we have seen in the preceding section, Origen

takes up some elements of Philo 1 s

interpretations of Gen

1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 with very little adaptation.

There

are also instances in Origen•s exegesis where a Philonic
interpretation has been influential, but is not explicitly
included in Origen•s exposition.

Instead, Origen simply
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includes the conclusions of Philo's interpretation without
providing the logical connections which Philo makes in developing the interpretation.

In such cases, Origen's inter-

pretations seem inconsistent because the philosophical presuppositions which inform the interpretations are not made
explicit.

These presuppositions are often made explicit in

Philo, so an understanding of Philo is essential to a proper
understanding of Origen.

Such instances are usually cases

where Origen simply assumes that his audience is aware of
the background of an idea and feels no need to elaborate.
Origen would not see this assumption as an advance upon
Philo's thought, nor as a distortion of Philo's work.
We have seen in the second chapter of this thesis
that Origen alternates between describing the content of the
similarity between God and man as being related to incorruptibility and
virtue.

immortality,

and as being related to

Philo exhibits this same tendency to shift from

conceiving the similarity of man to God in 'terms of incorruptibility to terms of virtue.
why this shift is justifiable.

But Philo also indicates
An examination of Philo's

position helps clarify Origen's "inconsistency" when he
identifies the characteristic which makes man like God as
both immortality,

and as the possession and exercise of

virtue.
In Legum Allegoriae I, Philo argues that Scripture
presents descriptions of the creation of two different men:
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a "heavenly," ideal man in Gen 1:26-27, and an earthly man,
who is part of the sensible world,

in Gen 2:6-7.30

In a

detailed description of the creation of this second, earthly
man,

Philo points out that the mind of this man is also

earthly, and therefore corruptible and mortal.

Therefore,

God breathes into the face of this man, granting a portion
of divinity to him.

Thus, God gives the earthly man the

power of "true life."

The mind of the earthly man becomes

a soul endowed with true mind, and thus truly alive.31
this point,

Philo associates

At

the divine breath with

immortality.
Later on in his exegesis, Philo addresses the question of why God gave the divine breath to the earthly, inferior man,

and not to the heavenly, ideal man.

God did not

wish to create any soul which is devoid of virtue.

If God

had not granted a portion of divinity to the earthly man,
his soul would be a soul without virtue.
this,

In addition to

God wished to make obedience to his commands (i.e.,

virtuous behavior) a duty.

God granted the "divine breath"

to the earthly man to forestall the possibility of pleading
ignorance as an excuse for disobedience.
his exegesis,

At this point in

Philo identifies the "divine breath" with a

concept or experience of virtue.32
Origen also tends to slide between the identification of virtue as the content of man's similarity to God,
and the idea that man is like God inasmuch as man possesses
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a soul or spirit that is incorruptible and immortal, just as
God is incorruptible and immortal.33

Origen varies between

these two theories in different interpretations of Gen 1:2627;

Philo's shift occurs in a single interpretation which

focuses on Gen 2:6-7.

This fact makes it unlikely that

Origen is simply adopting Philo's interpretation in this
case.

But it is likely that Origen is adopting Philo's

"manner of speaking" about the similarity between God and
man.

Origen takes the idea that man is like God in terms

of either immortality or virtue from Philo, and applies this
idea to his own interpretation of Gen 1:26-27.
But Origen does not make an explicit link between
the immortality of the soul or spirit, and the capacity of
the soul or spirit to exercise virtue.

In his interpreta-

tions of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, Origen tends to stress
one or the other,

and this gives his interpretations the

appearance of inconsistency in this regard.

This shift

in Origen's vocabulary is an indication that while Philo
makes the link between virtue and immortality explicitly and
deliberately, Origen simply assumes this link.

The associ-

ation of these two concepts along Platonic lines--the theory
that the contemplation and practice of virtue is the essence
of,

or the necessary condition for,

eternal life--is an

established part of Origen's intellectual equipment.

Origen

will stress whichever concept, immortality or virtue, which
best serves his purpose in a given context.

When Origen
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asserts that only man's spirit is made according to the
image of God,

immortality and incorruptibility are his pri-

mary concerns.

When Origen discusses the degree of differ-

ence between God and man (and between the present man, and
the future,
virtue.

perfect man), he focuses upon the concept of

The link between virtue and immortality has become

a ready assumption in Origen's mind, and does not need to be
made explicit or defended.

Philo does make this connection

explicit, and thus we have an idea of how they are linked in
Origen's theory as well.
A second example of Origen's tendency to include
Philonic conclusions in his exegesis while omitting explicit
support or explanation for these conclusions occurs when
Origen discusses what aspect of man is similar to God.
Philo consistently identifies this aspect as the mind (although some confusion between the terms "mind" and "soul 11
does appear in Philo).34

Philo identifies man's mind as the

aspect of man which is similar to God;

therefore, man's

rationality is a quality involved in the similarity of man
to God.

This fits in nicely with Philo's discussion of

virtue as the content of the similarity between God and
man.

For Middle Platonists, the practice of virtue is prac-

tically reducible to acting according to reason.
But Origen does not speak of man's mind as the aspect of man which bears the image of God; he tends to use
broader terms, such as man's spirit or soul or the

11

inner

94

man."

By doing so,

Origen derives two questions from what

Philo has treated as a single issue.

Origen separates the

question of what aspect (the "inner man," the soul or the
spirit) of man is similar to God from the question of how
(through reason,
God.

virtue or immortality) man is similar to

Of course, these two questions are closely related in

Origen, but the relatively ambiguous terms which he uses to
identify the divine aspect of man require that Origen be
specific in identifying the quality or qualities which are
common to God and man.

In the course of making this clari-

fication, Origen seldom refers to man•s mind, or to rationality as the common ground between God and man.
Origen•s comparative silence in regard to the divine
nature of man•s reason is not an indication that Origen has
a more negative view of man•s reason than Philo or Clement.
When Origen identifies the "inner man,

11

and not man•s mind,

as the bearer of the image of God, he is not questioning but
rather assuming the rationality of the "inner man."

This is

clear from the rare occasions when Origen draws the subject
of mind into his discussion of the divine aspect of man.
For example,
John,

in his Commentary on the Gospel of

Origen attempts to clarify the relationship between

God and the Logos,
proportion:

and man to the Logos, by presenting a

man•s reason is related to the Logos in the

same way that the Logos is related to God.
of the term "reason 11

The introduction

in regard to man is abrupt in this

95

passage; up to this point in his argument, Origen has been
discussing the Logos as the

11

divini ty 11 which God bestows

upon those men whom he wishes to make gods.

But Origen

wants to establish the connection between the reason in man
(logos) and the Logos, the son of God.35
Here Origen identifies man's rationality as the
aspect which is divine.

His argument assumes this identifi-

cation when he makes the abrupt shift from discussing the
Logos as the divinity bestowed upon some men to discussing
the relationship of reason to the Logos and the Logos to
God.

The shift is comprehensible when understood in the

light of a Philonic understanding of the essential divinity
of man's rationality.
Origen uses the term "reason 11 in this instance in
much the same way that Philo uses the term "mind 11
in Legum Allegoriae.36

the

11

true mind,

11

Philo and Origen are referring to

the exercise of reason

ly or ideal principles.

(nous)

accor~ing

.

to heaven-

The rationality which contributes

to simple existence, the exercise of the faculty which allows man to distinguish and judge between sensations and
desires,

is not the issue under discussion.

Philo makes

his peculiar usage of this term clear by contrasting i t to
the "mind" which is common to man and all animals;

but

Origen simply assumes that the peculiarity of his usage is
apparent.

Furthermore,

in the rest of his interpretations

of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, Origen feels no need to speci-
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fically affirm the peculiar rationality proper to the
man."

11

inner

The fact that the inner man acts rationally is so

obvious to Origen that he feels no need to discuss it.
By reading Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-21
and Gen 2:6-1 from a Philonic perspective, the logical gaps
in these interpretations are bridged.

Origen assumes the

rationality of the divine aspect of man, just as he assumes
a

logical connection between virtue and immortality.

But

since the rationale of these assumptions is not spelled out
in Origen's expositions, his interpretations seem inconsis-

tent at these points.

Philo does indicate the rationale of

identifying reason as the divine aspect of man, and of linking virtue to immortality.

Origen assumes that his audience

is sufficiently aware of Philo's work that there is no need
to repeat Philo's entire argument.

Therefore, such a famil-

iarity with Philo's interpretations of Gen 1:26-21 and Gen
2:6-1 is essential for understanding Origen's interpretations of the same passages.

C.

Origen's Adaptations of Philonic Interpretations
We have seen that Origen sometimes uses concepts

which are found in Philo,

but without making the implica-

tions or sources of these concepts explicit.

By reading

Philo's more self-conscious use of these concepts, we come
to discover the implicit assumptions of Origen's work.

But

there are also instances where Origen deliberately moves
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beyond the positions found in Philo.

These are cases where

we can determine how Origen differs from Philo in his understanding of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7.

The specific modifi-

cation which Origen makes--the substitutions which he makes
in arguing for the same point as Philo, the different conclusions which he draws using the same premises--may indicate the specific areas of disagreement between the assumptions of these two exegetes.

We may be able to trace these

specific disagreements to the difference between their understanding of humanity, which arises from their differing
perspectives of the solution to the human problem.
For example, Origen does not follow Philo's argument
in asserting that the whole man, man as a composite of spiritual and physical natures,

is not the bearer of the simi-

larity to God indicated by Gen 1:26-27.
Origen make this assertion,

Both Philo and

but each exegete bases this

assertion on different arguments, and uses it for different
purposes.
When Philo insists that the composite man is not
the bearer of God's image, he is drawing a sharp distinction
between the man created in Gen 1:26-27 and the man created
in Gen 2:6-7.

The first story describes the creation of a

heavenly man created according to the image of God.

The

second story describes an earthly man who is composed of
two distinct natures:

body and soul.

this earthly man is

described as a mixture, a composite being.37

Since he is a
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composite being, the earthly man is in need of instruction.38

The heavenly man is the "true man," created accord-

ing to God's image, and such a man needs no instruction, nor
does he have any share in corruptible substances.39
Philo uses this assertion in different contexts.
Sometimes he insists on an ontological difference between
the heavenly man of Gen 1:26-21 and the earthly man of Gen
2:6-1.

Other times, Philo argues for the superiority and

independence of man•s rational aspect, using this assertion
as the basis of his argument.

But in every case, Philo uses

the assertion that the composite man is not made according
to God's likeness to make a philosophical observation concerning human nature.

These anthropological assertions

are supported by Philo's interpretation of Scripture, but
they do not refer to, or rely upon, Philo's concept of God.
Therefore,

these anthropological assertions are not theo-

logical.
Origen also insists that the composite nature of man
does not possess any essential similarity to God.

Origen•s

argument differs from Philo's, however, in that Origen consistently refers to the simple nature of God as the basis
for his assertion.

God is entirely simple; we cannot speak

of God as having parts, especially hierarchically related
parts.

Since God is simple, whatever is made according to

God's image must be simple.

Therefore, man as a composite

creature cannot bear God's image.40

99

Origen•s argument
Origen uses a

is essentially theological.

theological axiom--an axiom concerning the

nature of God--to make an anthropological assertion.

In

this instance, Origen•s line of argumentation differs significantly from Philo's.
Origen sometimes departs from Philo's exegetical
technique as well as his argumentative technique.

Such

departures indicate fundamental differences in Origen's and
Philo's interpretations.

For instance, Philo usually inter-

prets Gen 1:26-27 in conjunction with Gen 2:6-7, often contrasting the two different men created in these passages.
But Origen seldom links these two stories together, even for
the purpose of contrast.

Furthermore, although Philo has a

tendency to emphasize the importance of the first creation
story over the second,41 he still discusses the second creation story at great length.

Origen emphasizes the first

creation story to such an extent that he tends to treat the
second creation story very briefly.

References to Gen 2:6-7

occur much less frequently in Origen's work than references
to Gen 1:26-27.

Origen follows Philo's example in this

regard, but carries his emphasis of Gen 1:26-27 to a greater
extreme.
The reason why Origen is more willing than Philo to
simply pass over the second creation story is that these two
authors have significantly different opinions regarding the
actual subjects of these stories.

Although Philo relies

100

upon and communicates a varied tradition of interpretation
in his exegesis of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, he himself
insists that these two stories describe the creation of two
different men.42

The heavenly or ideal man is created in

Gen 1:26-27, and is identified as a member of the intelligible realm.

The earthly man, repeatedly described as being

of a mixed nature, is created in Gen 2:6-7.
is the first human being.

This latter man

Philo discusses both in his ef-

fort to derive a proper understanding of man, and a proper
moral regimen for the individual man, from Scripture.
In the course of his various interpretations of Gen
1;26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, however, Philo also includes explanations in which the two creation stories are conflated; he
then proceeds to pry them apart.

Origen has been influenced

by these conflated interpretations as well as by Philo's
explicit inclination to separate the two stories.
result,

As a

Origen does not think that these creation stories

depict the origins of two different aen,

but rather the

origins of two distinct aspects of man, which currently
co-exist but which have been created separately, and are
destined to be separated.
Origen makes this position clear the Prologue to his
Commentary on the Song of Songs.43

Here, Origen starts to

assert that Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 describes the creation
of two different men,

but then adduces a passage from Paul

to point out that these two "men" are found in every man.
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Origen interprets Scripture as showing that the two aspects
of human existence which these two "men" represent are distinct,

and destined to be separated.

But he also under-

stands both creation stories to refer to man as he presently
exists.

Thus, Origen can accept interpretations where the

two creation stories appear to be conflated, since he understands both stories to refer to the creation of man.

But

Origen insists on treating the two stories separately, because he wishes to emphasize the difference between the
spiritual aspect of man, whose creation is described in Gen
1:26-27, and the physical aspect of man, which is created in
Gen 2:6-7.
In making this argument, Origen insists that the two
creation of man stories in Genesis describe the creation of
two different aspects of man--figuratively,
"men. 11

two different

He refuses to give credence to the idea that the two

stories refer to the same event.44
to Origen's position,

This point is essential

because this interpretation of Gen

1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 occurs within the context of his Commentary on the Song of Songs.
The premise of this commentary is that the Song of
Songs uses corporeal images to explore spiritual truths.
This is a legitimate technique, in spite of the provocative
imagery used in the Song of Songs, because the inner and the
outer man are distinct from each other, but similar enough
that a common vocabulary may be applied to both.45

If Gen
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1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 describes the creation of only one
man,

than there is no distinction and no similarity.

If

this is the case, the Song of Songs, with its lush corporeal
imagery,

cannot be considered a wholesome, much less in-

spired, book.

The argument that the Song of Songs can com-

municate spiritual truths through this imagery is eliminated.

So Origen must assert the existence of two distinct

but similar aspects of man in order to interpret the Song of
Songs allegorically.
While Origen and Philo agree in emphasizing the
importance of Gen 1:26-27 over Gen 2:6-7, some of the basic
assumptions which underlie their interpretations are different.

Origen understands these two stories as referring to

the creation of two aspects of man; Philo understands the
stories as describing the creation of two different men.
This difference has repercussions in many of the instances
where Origen adopts Philo's exegetical vocabulary and techniques.

Both exegetes tend to contrast the earthly man with

the spiritual man, the man described in Gen 1:26-27 with the
one described in Gen 2:6-7.

In making this contrast, both

tend to employ a tripartite anthropology, which is fundamentally dualistic.

The three aspects of the human nature

which both exegetes assume are separates into two categories:

the earthly and the spiritual.

But there are signi-

ficant differences in the anthropologies which Origen and
Philo adopt in their interpretations.
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Philo tends to describe the three aspects of man's
nature in terms from Plato's Timaeus.
parts:

Man consists of three

the rational soul, the sensate soul, and the body

and its organs of sensation.46

Philo's interpretations of

Gen 2:6-7 emphasizes the distinction between the rational
soul, which is of divine origin, and the sensate soul, which
man shares with the beasts and which is a part of the earthly man's carnal existence.

In effect, Philo assumes that

the spiritual aspect of man is simply unitary--it consists
only of the divine element in man, reason.47
Origen also employs a tripartite anthropology, which
makes a dualistic distinction between the spiritual and
carnal aspects of man's existence.

But Origen's system

distinguishes between the spirit and soul and body.

Both

man's spirit and soul are parts of the higher, spiritual
aspect of human existence; only the body and its sensations
and desires are part of the carnal aspect of man's existence.

The animating principle of man, the soul, is treated

with some ambiguity.

Sometimes the soul is identified as

the divine aspect within man; other times,

it is distin-

guished from the truly divine aspect of man,
But in such cases,

the spirit.

the soul is destined to cling to the

spirit and become truly spiritual--and truly divine-itself.48

So for Origen, the spiritual aspect of man has

two parts, the spirit and the soul, and the carnal aspect is
unitary.
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This difference between Philo and Origen is related
to their different perspectives of the "earthly" man, man as
he currently exists.49

Philo interprets Gen 1:26-21 and Gen

2:6-1 with the intention of discerning how the heavenly

aspect of aan comes to exist in a mortal creature, and his
interpretations tend to focus on how the earthly man can be
as much like the ideal man as possible.50

But the primary

use of his interpretations of Gen 1:26-21 and Gen 2:6-1 is
to show how the creation stories may be interpreted as stories about the individual human soul.

In doing this, Philo

emphasizes these stories as sources of information regarding
what the soul is.51

Philo interprets these stories in order

to establish an anthropological theory upon which a moral
regimen may be based.
Origen thinks the two creation of man stories refer
to two aspects of man as he currently exists.

In inter-

preting Gen 1:26-21 and Gen 2:6-1 in this fashion,
(like Philo)

is primarily concerned with discovering how

Scripture relates to the individual's situation.
Origen,

Origen

But for

this process involves describing how the spiritual

aspect may be nurtured and emphasized, since this is the
immortal and divine aspect of man's existence.

Origen in-

terprets these two stories in order to describe how the
earthly man may become completely heavenly.

His emphasis is

more on the moral regimen which is implicit in the creation
of man stories,

than on directly describing the nature of
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the soul as he finds it in Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7.
Origen•s insistence that the two creation of man
stories describe the creation of two different aspects of
man, not the creation of two different men, is the primary
area where Origen departs from Philo's exegesis of Gen 1:2627 and Gen 2:6-7.

Nevertheless,

Origen may be drawing

upon Philo in making this assertion.

At various points in

his interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, Philo
talks about the two different men as though they are types
of men found in the world.52
Origen justifies his exegetical theory by supposing
that there are three types of men found in the world.

But

we have seen how these three types of men are distinguished
from each other on the basis of what part of their human
psyche predominates in them.53

For Origen,

it is a short

step from discussing types of men to discussing aspects of
men, which are the source for distinguishing such classifications.
Philo.

This shift may occur in Origen•s reading of

Origen reads Philo's assertion that Gen 1:26-27 and

Gen 2:6-7 describes the creation of two different men, and
agrees--but in the sense that these two men are paradigms of
men who are characterized by one or the other aspect of
man's existence.

III.

Conclusion
From this analysis of the influence which Clement of
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Alexandria and Philo of Alexandria have had on Origen's
interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, we have obtained a

clearer understanding of these interpretations.

Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-·7 differ
from Clement's,

and these differences highlight three as-

pects of Origen's understanding of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7.

First, Origen draws a sharp contrast between the condi-

tion of man as he currently exists, and man as he will exist
in his perfected state.

Secondly,

Origen's soteriology

places a special emphasis on the re-establishment of man's
original similarity to the Logos.

Finally, Origen acknowl-

edges a scriptural description of man's corporeal aspect,
and thus puts himself in the position of needing to deal
with this aspect.

These three conclusions will be important

to the exploration of Origen's theological anthropology and
soteriology in the next chapter of this thesis.
Our examination of Philo's influence on Origen's
interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 has been even
more

fruitful

in terms of providing information about

Origen's theological anthropology and soteriology.

We have

seen that Origen's Logos theology comes from his adoption of
certain Philonic interpretations of Gen 1:26-28;

therefore

we must anticipate a non-Christian element in Origen's Logos
theology.

We have also seen that Origen's odd shifts be-

tween identifying virtue and immortality as the content of
the similarity between God and man are based upon a Philonic
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perspective which relates virtue and immortality.
more,

Further-

Origen's understanding of the essential divinity of

man's reason has been emphasized and clarified.
The analysis of the instances where Origen departs
from Philo's interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7
has also provided valuable information.

We have seen that

Origen makes an effort to construct an explicitly theological anthropology--an anthropology which is based on concepts
of God and man's relationship to God.

Origen also differs

from Philo by insisting on an ontological relationship between the inner,
and the outer,

spiritual man described in Gen 1:26-28

corporeal man described in Gen 2:6-7.

For

Origen,

this relationship is not that of an archetype to an

image;

both "men" are aspects of each human individual.

Furthermore,

while these aspects are distinct,

they are

sufficiently alike that knowledge of one can be applied,
with modifications, to the other.

Therefore, Origen is able

to find spiritual significance in the corporeal aspect of
man.
Finally, we have seen that Origen's tripartite anthropology,

developed in the context of interpreting Gen

1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7,

is different from Philo's.

Origen

thinks man's spiritual aspect consists of two parts, a soul
and a spirit.

This concept is not Philonic.

When Philo

distinguishes man's rational soul from man's sensate soul,
the latter is clearly a part of man's corporeal aspect.
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origen's tripartite anthropology seems to be his own invention.
Equipped with these conclusions, and the analysis of
Origen's interpretations in chapter 2 of this thesis, we are
prepared to explore Origen's theological anthropology and
correlative soteriology as they are developed in relation to
Origen's understanding of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7.

CHAPTER IV
ORIGEN'S THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND
INCARNATIONAL THEOLOGY
Studies of Origen's theology tend to focus on the
theories which Origen proposes in his writings, and the
philosophical presuppositions which produce these theories.
But Origen usually proposes these theories within the context of interpreting Scripture.

Origen's theological spec-

ulation occurs within the context of Biblical interpretation;

his interpretation of specific passages of Scripture

leads to specific theological theories.

We can best under-

stand Origen's theoretical proposals through an examination
of the scriptural interpretations which give rise to these
proposals.
This thesis is an examination of Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9 for the purposes of
illuminating Origen's theological anthropology, incarnational

theology and soteriology.

Because only these pas-

sages are under consideration, only the aspects of Origen's
theology which arise in connection with these passages will
be discussed.

While his theological anthropology greatly

depends on his interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9,
Origen develops his incarnational theology and soteriology
through the interpretation of many different texts.
fore,

There-

many aspects of Origen's incarnational theology and
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soteriology will be neglected in this chapter.

The conclu-

sions of this chapter are only a partial contribution to the
study of Origen's understanding of the saving work of the
incarnate Logos.
This chapter will begin with a summary of Origen's
theological anthropology as he develops it in relation to
his interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9.

We will

pay close attention to the specific problem which Origen
sees as man's principal affliction, and the general solution
which this problem entails.
Due to Origen's insistence that "the end be like the
beginning,"1 the next step will be analysis of Origen's
understanding of man's original condition, especially man's
original relationship to the Logos.

Since Origen thinks

that man's original condition will be his final condition,
this analysis will provide us with an understanding of what
the saving work of Christ, the incarnate Logos, is to accomplish.

Of course, since Origen believes that man's original

condition was purely spiritual, without any corporeal aspect, this analysis will focus on the relationship of man as
a pure spirit to the unincarnate Logos.
Finally,

we shall examine the specific solution

which Origen juxtaposes to the human problem:
work of Christ, the incarnate Logos.

the salvific

This examination will

focus on the specific contribution of the Incarnation of the
Logos to the salvation of man, as Origen describes it in his
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interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9.

Origen inter-

prets these passages in such a way that they not only refer
to the problem inherent in the current human condition, but
they also contain implicit or explicit indications of the
saving work of Christ.

I.

Origen's Theological Anthropology:
Existence

The Flaw in Man's

The key concepts of Origen's general understanding
of man's fall are the pre-existence of souls, the punitive
or remedial character of corporeality, and the soul's destined return to its original state.
are involved,

All of these concepts

explicitly or implicitly,

in Origen's inter-

pretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9 which we examined in
Chapter 2 of this thesis.

Now we shall attempt to assemble

these individual concepts into an organized theological
anthropology.

Such an anthropology is often best expressed

through a narrative, rather than theoretically.
Origen's "myth" of the fall,

is the story through

which he conveys his understanding of the problem with mankind in general.

Origen's theological anthropology is based

on his conviction that originally,
souls at all.

human souls were not

What we now call human souls were originally

created as pure spirits, pure intellects.2
of the intellectual realm.

They were part

These pure spirits were created

without bodies, and were therefore intended to be incorruptible.

Anything which exists without a body is not naturally
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liable to corruption.3

But these pure spirits were created

with free will and, by the disobedient exercise of the will,
these spirits "fell away" from their original relationship
with God.4

This "falling away" occurred through a defect in

the love the created spirits came to have for God.
result of their failure to love God,
became different spiritual entities.

As a

these pure spirits

The kind of spiritual

entity which they became depended on the degree to which
they failed to love God.5
One group of spirits failed by loving God in an
"intermediate" fashion--they did not lose their love for God
altogether, but this love was "cooled."

These spirits be-

came the spiritual entities which we now call human souls.6
These souls are peculiar creatures.

On the one hand, as we

have seen from our examination of Origen's interpretations
of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9,

these souls are spiritual.

They are linked (or, at least, they should be linked) to the
spirit--the entity which the soul itself once was.

Origen

seems to think that this entity still exists as man's intellect,

the highest faculty of man's soul.?

But because the

intellect exists in the soul as only one faculty,
than as an entity in its own right,

rather

its existence is im-

paired.
On the other hand,

souls are destined to be joined

with corporeal bodies, and even before they are embodied,
they have "carnal desires." 8

These desires, and the union
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of souls with corporeal bodies,

are meant to help souls

return to their original, purely spiritual state.9

But a

soul may misuse its embodiment, and regress in its efforts
to return to the spiritual state.10
An often neglected but central aspect of this description of the soul is the flawed spiritual nature of
the soul.

The soul exists as a "fallen" spirit.

The imme-

diate consequence of this fall is a degradation in the spiritual order:

a spirit becomes a soul.

This soul is spirit-

ual and retains some contact with its original condition.
But the soul is a flawed creature; it exists only because a
spirit freely chose to love God defectively.
Origen discusses the "fall" of the pure spirit, and
its consequent existence as a soul,

The spirit was made according to the image of

1:26-27.
God.

by referring to Gen

When the spirit falls and becomes a soul, this simi-

larity to

God remains,

although it may be obscured.11

Therefore, Origen is able to say that the human soul is made
according to the image of God,
faculty,

reason.

ness of God;

in regards to its highest

But the soul is not yet made in the like-

this greater similarity to God is part of the

soul's return to its original spiritual state.12

Before

it can undertake the quest for this greater similarity, the
soul must regain the clear "image of God" which it had before it fell and became a soul.

It must remove the defacing

"images" which hide the image of God.

These "images" are
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the result of the soul becoming entangled in the body and
its carnal desires,

which were intended to help the soul

become a spirit again.

Thus, before the soul can progress

in its return to complete spirituality,

it must purify it-

self from the body and its desires--even though God has
given these to the soul in order to help the soul become
a spirit.
The incarnation of the soul is part of the spirit's
punishment for making the choice to love God insufficiently.
But this punishment is fundamentally remedial.

God intends

the union of the human soul to a human body to help the soul
regain its original spiritual status.

Origen does not think

man's corporeal existence as such is part of the problem of
man's existence; the embodiment of the human soul is part of
God's solution to the human problem.l3
Origen proposes a soteriology in which a
spiritual creature

(the soul)

lower type of existence

flawed

requires the assistance of a

(union with a corporeal body)

in

order to regain a higher state of existence (the soul's
original spiritual existence).
entity,

The soul

is a spiritual

but it cannot regain its pure spiritual existence

unless it is united with a body--which is much less spiritual

than the soul itself.

The soul cannot simply "turn

itself around" and return to its purely spiritual status.
The soul must be joined to a body and "ricochet" from corporeal existence back to a purely spiritual existence.
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If we recall the Platonic idea that the rational
soul is subject to forgetfulness when it becomes embodied,
we may be able to understand Origen's argument better.

This

idea is similar, but not identical, to Origen's understanding of the condition of the soul.

For Origen, the soul

forgets its true nature in the process of becoming a soul.
In its failure to love God appropriately, a pure spirit
loses its sense of itself and becomes a soul.

This soul

cannot comprehend the spiritual realm directly, even though
it is a spiritual entity.

God joins this soul to a body so

that the soul can regain its original condition.

The body,

and the entire corporeal creation, is similar to the spiritual realm.

The soul is able to comprehend the physical

realm, and so the body and the entire physical universe is
able to remind the soul of the spiritual realm.

The body is

able to remind the soul of its original spiritual existence,
and thus help the soul recover its original condition.
Origen does not speak in terms of reminding the soul
of what it has forgotten.

He describes the recovery process

in terms of re-establishing the "image of God," the similarity man has to God through being similar to the Logos, within the soul.

When this similarity is re-established,

soul will be a pure spirit once again.14

the

But even though

the soul must be embodied to become a pure spirit once again,

the body must be left behind when the soul reaches

this goal.

Pure spirits do not have a corporeal dimen-
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sion.15
Thus, even though the embodiment of the human soul
is the first step in the rehabilitation of the soul, a time
will come when the soul must reject the body in order to
continue on its return to its original state as a pure spirit or intellect.

At some point, therefore, man's redemption

must involve a rejection of the corporeal dimension.l6

But

the soul may be reluctant to reject the corporeal dimension.

As we indicated earlier, the soul's carnal desires,

which were supposed to assist the soul's efforts to return
to the spiritual state, may entangle the soul with the
body.

The soul may misuse its embodied existence, and thus

experience the body as a hindrance to its return to the
spiritual realm.

By being entangled with a body, the soul

becomes less and less aware of its true spiritual nature.
This misuse of the body makes it more difficult for the soul
to reject the body.

The body becomes an impediment to the

soul, even though it was given to the soul as a help.

The

body becomes a detriment when the soul fails to use it properly.

Once again,

the fault lies with the soul, not with

the body itself.
The problem which Origen perceives in the current
human condition, then, is not that the soul has been joined
with a body.

Instead, the inherent problem in man's exist-

ence is that a purely spiritual entity has become a flawed
spiritual entity--a soul.

This flawed spiritual entity can
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either improve its condition, by re-establishing its original similarity to (and love for) God, or it can deteriorate
still further by continued disobedience to God.
rioration does not involve a

This dete-

further degradation in the

spiritual status of the soul:

the soul remains a soul.

But it does further diminish the spiritual quality of the
soul.

The soul becomes less aware and less responsive to

its highest faculty, the mind or spirit.17

The soul further

defaces the "image of God" which it still possesses.
Origen perceives the return of the soul to its original state as the solution to this problem within human
existence.

Using terms derived from his interpretations of

Gen 1:26-27, Origen describes this return as having two
steps.

The first step is the re-establishment of the image

of God within the soul.
ly lost,

This image has never been complete-

but it has been obscured or defaced.

step is to remove the defacement,
the image of God in the soul.

The first

the "images" drawn over

The second step is the soul's

gradual acquisition of the likeness of God, which is a more
perfect similarity to God than is implied by "the image of
God."18
Because the original spiritual creation had a close
relationship with the Logos, the rehabilitation of the soul
and its return to its original state depend on the activity
of the Logos.
formation of

Origen describes both steps in the transthe soul back into a

spirit as occurring

118
through the agency of the Logos.19

But Origen describes the

saving activity of the Logos in connection with the original
relationship of the Logos as pure spirits.
volves the recovery of this relationship.

Salvation inBefore we discuss

the activity of the Logos in saving man, we must examine the
goal of this activity:

the recovery of the original rela-

tionship between man's spirit and the Logos.

II.

Man and the Unincarnate Logos
From our analysis of Origen's interpretations of Gen

1:26-27, we are acquainted with Origen's understanding of
the Logos as a mediator between God and man.

This under-

standing emphasizes the distance between God and man.
lowing Philo,

Fol-

Origen insists that man has not been made

as an image of God,

but according to the image of God.20

This interpretation of Gen 1:26-27 indicates that the similarity between God and man is not immediate, but only derivative.

Man himself is not like God himself; man is like the

image of God, the Logos.

Of course, since the image of God

is like God, man does possess some similarity to God.

But

man is at a third remove from God, with the image of God,
the Logos, between God and man.
This position has often been attributed to Origen's
Middle Platonic perspective.21

The distance between the

transcendent, unitary God and the multiplicity of creatures
is an essential doctrine for this philosophical perspective.
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Origen,

as a Middle Platonist, would be obliged to stress

the distance between the One and the many.
But this interpretation of Gen 1:26-27 is not the
result of Origen's attempt to force Scripture into agreement
with his own philosophical perspective.22

On the contrary,

Origen stresses the distance between God and man for theological reasons.23
primarily apologetic.

In Contra Celsum,

these reasons are

Origen must refute Celsus' accusation

that Christians have an unworthy concept of God since they
believe that man is "just like" God, and man is manifestly
wicked.

Origen does not attempt to argue that man is suffi-

ciently good to merit comparison with God.
argues

Instead,

he

that Celsus has misunderstood Scripture and the

Christian position.
he currently exists,

Christians do not believe that man, as
is just like God.

Christians believe

that man has been created according to the image of God, and
therefore man bears a more distant similarity to God.24
Origen emphasizes the distance between God and man
for other reasons than that of refuting the accusation that
Christians have an unworthy concept of God.

In his other

writings, Origen interprets Gen 1:26-27 to stress this distance in order to set the stage for his understanding of
the saving work of the Logos.25

In order to discern this

soteriological element, we must recall Origen's understanding of Scripture as a whole.

We must also read these inter-

pretations in the light of Origen's distinction between
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the image of God and the likeness of God.
As we have seen in the first chapter of this thesis,
Origen thinks Scripture has been given to fallen man for his
salvation.

Scripture is given to man in order to lead man

back to God.
creation,

Therefore, when Scripture describes man's

it is addressing fallen man.

Is it possible that

Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9 is actually a description of the
"creation"

of

fallen mah?

This seems to be the case.

Origen interprets Scripture as describing the creation of
two aspects of man.

This is why there are two descriptions

of the creation of man.

But Origen's understanding of man's

original condition as a pure spirit cannot allow for distinct aspects within the original man:
have such aspects.

pure spirits cannot

Therefore, when Scripture asserts that

man has both spiritual and corporeal aspects,

Scripture

must be describing man as he currently exists.
When Gen 1:26-27 describes the creation of man's
spiritual aspect,

Scripture indicates that this aspect in-

cludes a remnant of man's previous existence as a pure spirit.

But the man described in both creation stories is man

as he currently exists.

Therefore,

when Origen insists

that the man (or the aspect of man} created in Gen 1:26-30
is related to God in a derivative fashion,

he is talking

about man as he currently exists.
When we recall Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:2627 which emphasize the distinction between the similarity to
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God implied by the "image of God" and the "likeness of God"
as a greater similarity to God which man must achieve, we
can see the soteriological element implicit in the interpretations which emphasize the distance between God and man
by placing the Logos as intermediary between them.

The man

who is so distant from God is man as he currently exists.
The perfected man will not only be more similar to the image
of God {the Logos), he will also possess an actual likeness
to God.

The perfected man will have a relationship with God

much like the relationship between the Logos and God.26

By

emphasizing the distance between man as he currently exists
and God, Origen emphasizes the difference between man as he
currently exists

(fallen man)

and man in his perfected

condition {redeemed man).
This is why Origen insists the Logos is a necessary
intermediary between fallen man and God.
fected,

When man is per-

his relationship with God will correspond to the

relationship of the Logos to God.27

Since man's perfection

is simply a return to man's original condition, man's original creation--not the creation recounted in Gen 1:26-30
and Gen 2:4-9, which describes the "creation" of fallen
man--was as a pure spirit intimately related to God.

Thus

man's perfection consists of re-establishing this relationship.
The soteriological element of Origen's concept of
the Logos as intermediary between God and man consists of
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this insistence that fallen man must have his original similarity with the Logos re-established.

The original similar-

ity between "man"--i.e., the spiritual entity which became a
human soul--and the Logos existed because the Logos was the
agent and model for the creation of the spiritual realm.28
But even though the purely spiritual realm is intimately
related to the Logos,

the agent and model of its creation,

it is also intimately related to God the Father.
because of its relationship with the Logos,

In fact,

the spiritual

realm is related to God in a way which corresponds to the
relationship of the Logos and God.

Thus,

the spiritual

realm does not relate to God through the Logos so much as it
relates to God in the same way as the Logos.29 The Logos
functions as an intermediary in reference to fallen spirits
(e.g.,

human souls).

In reference to the pure spiritual

realm, Origen de-emphasizes the role of

~~os

as intermedi-

ary in favor of stressing the similarity between the Logos
and pure spirits.
The similarity between the Logos and pure spirits
exists due to the role of the Logos in the creation of the
spiritual realm.

This has been observed by various critics

of Origen as a defective element in Origen's christology and
soteriology.30

The most intimate relationship with the

Logos exists on a strictly spiritual plane, apart from the
Incarnation of the Logos.

This appears to imply that Origen

does not consider the Incarnation to be a central element in
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the relationship between God, the Logos and man.
But it is important to note that the relationship of
the Logos to spirits refers to the original spiritual realm
--and therefore does not directly refer to "man" at all.
This relationship does not exist between the Logos and the
human soul,

because the human soul is no longer a purely

spiritual entity.

In the original spiritual realm,

there

was no "spirit of man" distinguishable from other spirits.
Diversity among spirits is the result of the disobedience of
spirits,

some of whom disobeyed in such a way that they

became human souls and later embodied human souls.31

Thus,

the relationship between the Logos and pure spirits does not
directly apply to man,

since the distinct creature "man"

does not exist in the purely spiritual realm.

A remnant of

this relationship between the Logos and spirits exists between man and the Logos since man's rational and spiritual
aspect

is

a

remnant of his original,

purely spiritual

state.

When man has been returned to his original state, he

will once again share in this relationship of similarity to
the Logos--but at this point, man will no longer be human.
He will once again be a pure spirit.
is

The unincarnate Logos

intimately related to such spirits.

But since man is

not a pure spirit, we cannot assert the existence of such a
relationship between man and the unincarnate Logos.
We have seen that while some similarity between man
and the unincarnate Logos exists,

man's salvation depends
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upon the complete re-establishment of this similarity.
Origen's thinks that only the incarnate Logos is able to
re-establish the similarity between himself and man,

and

therefore the Incarnation is a key aspect of Origen's soteriology.

III.

The Incarnate Logos
As we mentioned in the introduction to this chapter,

Origen's understanding of the role played by the incarnate
Logos has been discussed by scholars from various perspectives.

These various perspectives have produced a variety

of models for the soteriological aspect of Origen's incarnational theology.

Many scholars believe that Origen's soter-

iology is primarily didactic,

and attribute this to the

influence of Clement of Alexandria.32

Others claim that the

model of Christ vanquishing the powers of evil and freeing
man from Satan predominates in Origen's soteriology.33
Still others point to Origen's understanding of the Logos as
an intermediary between the unity of God and the multiplicity of creatures,

and insist that Origen's concept of the

Logos as possessing different manifestations

(~inoiai)

is

the key to Origen's soteriology.34
Danielou attempts to organize all of these elements
into a soteriological system.35

He argues that Origen be-

lieves Christ, the incarnate Logos, defeats Satan and frees
man,

and then proceeds to teach man how to use his freedom
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to turn to God.

Christ is uniquely able to instruct man,

because Christ is able to adapt himself to the capacities of
each individual.

This adaptability exists in Christ by

means of the various manifestations which exist in Christ.
Danielou's system includes the various elements of Origen's
soteriology which appear in Origen's writings, but neglects
the scriptural interpretations which produce and nuance
these elements.

In addition, the role played by the Incar-

nation in the salvation of man receives scant attention.
Danielou is not the only author to downplay the
role of the Incarnation in Origen's soteriology.
only point where

Almost the

the secondary literature agrees about

Origen's soteriology is in pointing out that the Incarnation
does not play a central role in Origen's theological reflection on man's salvation.36

No one denies Origen's belief in

the Incarnation; scholars agree that Origen believes in the
historicity of the Incarnation, and gives it some role in
his soteriological writings.

But most scholars think Origen

fails to explore the soteriological significance of the
Incarnation to any great extent.

The agreed upon conclusion

is that Origen tends to stress the role of the unincarnate
Logos to the neglect of the Incarnation, although scholars
disagree about why this is the case.37
Our examination of Origen's interpretations of Gen
1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9 does not resolve the confusion which
exists concerning Origen's soteriology, but it does place

126
Origen's understanding of the soteriological significance of
the Incarnation in a different light.
carnation

in

described,

explicitly or implicitly,

The role of the In-

the salvation of man

is emphasized and
in many of Origen's

interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9.
Origen's first Homily on Genesis has been the keystone of our examination of these interpretations.
homily,

In this

Origen uses Gen·1:26-27 to comment on the saving

work of the Logos.

The problem inherent in man's current

existence is that man has "drawn over" or defaced the similarity to the Logos which exists in his spiritual nature.
This similarity must be re-established.

The Logos accom-

plishes this by becoming man.

first Homily on

In his

Genesis, Origen explicitly shows the Incarnation to be a key
aspect in the redemption of man.38
The description of the salvific effect of the Incarnation is less clear in this passage than the assertion
that the Incarnation is salvifically effective.

Since the

Logos became man, all who come to the incarnate

~egos

made similar to him in proportion to their ability.

are

Because

the Logos became man, everyone who comes to him is made like
the incarnate Logos.

This establishes a new similarity

between man and the Logos.

Originally, spirits (who later

became human souls) were like
man (an embodied soul)
Logos.

th~

unincarnate Logos.

Now,

is made similar to the incarnate

Through this new similarity, man will be able to
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regain his original similarity to the Logos.
Origen implies that man is able to move from this
new similarity with the incarnate Logos back to his original
similarity with the unincarnate Logos by contemplating the
incarnate Logos.

When the Logos became man,

the body and

soul of the Logos became divinized, i.e., made spiritua1.39
Man is lead to a participation in the spiritual nature of
the Logos by contemplating the divinized,
of the Logos.

incarnate nature

Thus man can regain his own original spirit-

ual form, i.e., his original form as a spirit similar to the
unincarnate Logos.
The key to Origen's soteriology in connection with
his interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9 is his
insistence on the need for establishing a new similarity
between man and the Logos before the old similarity can be
regained.
not

The soul is unable to retrace its steps; it can-

return directly to its original similarity to the

Logos.

The soul has defaced its similarity to the image of

God to such an extent that the soul cannot recognize this
image within itself.

A new similarity between the soul and

the image of God is necessary before the soul can perceive
and renew the old similarity with the Logos.
tion of the

Log~

The Incarna-

establishes this new similarity.40

In order to establish the new similarity between man
and the Logos, the Logos must truly become man.

For Origen,

this means that Jesus Christ must have a spirit, soul and
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body as all men do.41

In the case of the Incarnation,

Origen's tripartite anthropology leads him into difficulty.
Origen understands man's soul to be a
spiritual entity.
man's soul,

Man's spirit,

fallen and flawed

the highest faculty of

is the remnant of the pure spiritual entity

which the soul once was.

The body is God's provision for

the soul to lead it back to its spiritual nature.

But the

Logos is not the same thing as a pure spirit, even though
pure spirits are like the Logos.

Nor is the Logos such a

thing as can "fall," become a soul and thus require a body
to become purely spiritual again.42

Therefore, Origen po-

sits the existence of a particular spirit which did not
fall when the rest of the spiritual realm fell
human souls or demons or whatever).

(and became

This spirit was so

attached to the Logos as to become one with the Logos.

This

spirit voluntarily became a soul and united with a body in
order to accomplish the salvation of man.43
The crucial issue in this theory of the Incarnation
is the union of the Logos with the spirit which is to become
the soul of Jesus Christ.

The concept of this union makes

Origen's incarnational theology somewhat clumsy,

because

there are four aspects of Jesus rather than three:
Logos,

the spirit which is united with the Logos,

the

the soul

of Christ (which has the spirit united with the Logos as its
highest faculty), and the body of Christ.44
The concept of a spirit united with the Logos seems
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superfluous as well as awkward.

If a pure spirit can volun-

tarily accept degradation to the status of a soul,45 why
can't the Logos, who is so similar to such spirits, do the
same?

This would eliminate the extra term in Origen's

christological anthropology.

Christ would be an embodied

soul, like all mankind, but the highest faculty in this soul
would be the Logos.
Origen does seem to adopt this simpler incarnational
theology on some occasions.46

But for the most part,

he

insists on the awkward inclusion of a distinct spirit which
unites with the Logos.

Apparently, Origen does not think

that the similarity between pure spirits and the Logos is so
great as to allow the Logos himself to be changed into a
lower spiritual entity,

the way pure spirits are changed

when they become souls.

Because Origen insists on this

distinction between pure spirits and the Logos, in spite of
his assertion that

spirits are similar to the Logos,

Origen's incarnational theology is awkward.47

Even when he

speaks about the original relationship between created spirits and the Logos, Origen is careful to distinguish between
the divine and non-divine spheres of existence.
discusses the relationship between souls and the

When he

~Qgos,

this

distinction is so important that Origen allows it to strain
his incarnational theology.
This theory of the Incarnation would not only be
simpler than the one which Origen usually proposes, it would
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be more convincing in regard to the Logos actually becoming
man.

As it stands, Origen's incarnational theology depends

upon an intimate union of a spirit and the Logos.

Unless

these two are actually united,

the Logos cannot be under-

stood as truly becoming man.

Instead,

a spirit who is

closely connected with the Logos voluntarily becomes an
embodied soul; no Incarnation of the Logos himself occurs.
But Origen's soteriology requires the actual Incarnation of
the Logos.

Therefore, Origen insists on an

actua~

union of

a particular spirit and the Logos, and the subsequent voluntary degradation of that spirit to an impaired spiritual
existence as a soul.

IV.

Conclusion
The Incarnation is a crucial element in Origen's

soteriology because of his understanding of man's fallen
condition.

The fall caused a pure spirit to become an im-

paired spiritual entity, a soul.
ied in order to be saved

A soul needs to be embod-

(i.e.,

to become a pure spirit

again), because a soul cannot comprehend its original existence as a pure spirit.

It needs to learn of the spiritual

realm through a metaphor or simile.

The body and the entire

physical world acts as a metaphor of the spiritual order.
The physical world is able to do this because it is similar
to the spiritual order; because the body is less than the
soul, the soul can comprehend the body, and so the metaphor

131

is available to the soul.
But a soul is likely to misuse its embodied condition for the same reason that it needs to be embodied:

the

soul has lost its ability to perceive its highest faculty-the

spirit or reason--as its true self.

not know its true nature,

Because it does

the soul may regard its current

embodied condition as its true nature.

When this happens,

the soul becomes less and less aware of its original existence,

its original relationship with God, and its original

similarity to the Logos.
In order to save this confused creature,
becomes like the soul in its present condition.
becomes incarnate.

the Logos
The Logos

Since the incarnate Logos, Christ,

is

like the embodied soul, Christ is able to reveal to the soul
its true spiritual character,
gain this character.

and show the soul how to re-

Christ illuminates the metaphor of

corporeal existence for the soul, and points out to the soul
the similarity between the physical realm and the spiritual
realm.

Christ is able to do this by revealing the divine,

spiritual aspect of his own embodied condition.

Since the

embodied soul is similar to the embodied Christ, this similarity enables the soul to perceive the spiritual, semi-divine aspect of its own condition.

This perception is the

first step towards the salvation of the soul.
For the soul to be saved, however,
its original

condition,

its original

it must regain

similarity to the
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Logos, and its original relationship to God.
and example of Christ,
how this can be done.

the incarnate Logos, shows the soul
Along the way, the soul will have to

reject the body and the corporeal world.
mature,

The teaching

When the soul is

it must abandon the metaphor for the reality.

the corporeal world is abandoned completely,
once again be a pure spirit.

When

the soul will

It will once again enjoy a

relationship to God modeled after the relationship of the
Logos to God.

CONCLUSION
In his

comprehensive study on Origen,

Danielou

points out that Origen's
position is the same whether the question at issue is the
material side of worship, the literal meaning of Scripture or the visible humanity of Christ:
he affirms the
reality of all three, but at the same time he regards
them only as starting points.1
Our study of Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and
Gen 2:4-9 supports Danielou's opinion, but it also reveals
crucial nuances in Origen's attitude toward man's embodied
condition.

The literal meaning of Scripture,

man's own

embodied condition and the Incarnation of the Logos are all
only "starting points" for Origen, and all are destined to
be superceded by a stronger, more spiritual existence and
knowledge.

But all

three are necessary starting points;

they are the vehicles by which God returns the fallen soul
to its higher spiritual existence.
We began this study with an examination of Origen's
exegetical method,

in order to establish a context for ex-

amining Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen
2:4-9.

Our examination of his exegetical method revealed

Origen's somewhat paradoxical understanding of the "bodily"
meaning of Scripture.

On the one hand, Origen exerts tre-

mendous effort to establish the literal meaning of a scriptural

text.

Origen insists that this level of meaning is

beneficial, to some degree, for all Christians.
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But on the other hand, all those who wish to advance
in the spiritual life must move beyond the "bodily" meaning
of the text, and discern the higher, spiritual truths which
God wants Scripture to convey.

Since the spiritual meaning

of Scripture is the meaning which God primarily intends
Scripture to communicate, we are obliged to go beyond the
"bodily" meaning of the text in favor of the spiritual meaning.
The discernment of the spiritual meaning requires
the use of allegorical interpretation.

~llegory

enables the

Christian to move beyond the literal meaning of the text and
to perceive the spiritual meaning.

But as Origen develops

his allegorical method, we see that the "bodily" meaning of
the text is the necessary medium for communicating the spiritual meaning.

The Christian can discern the spiritual

meaning of Scripture only by thoroughly understanding the
literal level of meaning.
A thorough understanding of the literal meaning of
Scripture enables us to discern the inaccuracies and impossibilities within this level of meaning.

These stumbling-

blocks indicate the existence of another level of meaning
within the text--otherwise,
ture is unreliable.

they would be proof that Scrip-

They are also the keys for discovering

the content of this other level of meaning;
spiritual truths which Scripture contains.
stumbling-blocks,

the highest

Without these

the highest and truest meaning of Scrip-
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ture would be inaccessible.
Scripture,

The lowest level of meaning in

and the "weakest" aspects of this level--the

inaccuracies in the literal meaning--must be surpassed in
favor of higher truth.

But these "weak" aspects of Scrip-

ture are the means by which God communicates the greatest
truths to fallen man.
Our examination of Origen's interpretations of Gen
1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9,

and the theological anthropology

which he constructs from these interpretations, shows that
Origen has a very similar understanding of man's current
embodied condition.
realm,

The body,

and the entire corporeal

is weaker than the spiritual realm,

achieve spiritual existence.

Therefore,

and unable to

the body must be

abandoned in the course of man's recovery of pure, spiritual
existence.

But the body is the only means by which man is

able to regain a purely spiritual existence.
Man's current existence is essentially flawed.

If

pure spirits had not fallen away from God, no "human souls"
as we know them would have existed.

But pure spirits did

fall through the disobedient exercise of free will, and some
fell in such a way that they became human souls.

God joined

these souls to bodies in order that they might regain their
original spiritual status.

The flaw in man's current condi-

tion is that he is a soul rather than a pure spirit.

The

body is God's means of enabling the soul to become a spirit
once again.
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The lowest level of meaning in Scripture, specifically the "weakest" aspect of this level,

is the means by

which God communicates the highest truths.

In the same way,

God provides souls, which are spiritual creatures, with a
weaker aspect--the body--in order to lead these souls back
to a pure spiritual existence.

Even though the body is less

spiritual than the soul, the body is able to assist the soul
in its return to a higher spiritual existence.
But by becoming a pure spirit once again,
will be forced to leave the body behind.

the soul

As the Christian

advances in the spiritual life, both the "bodily" meaning of
Scripture and the human body itself will become unnecessary.
If the Christian is reluctant to abandon the aspects of his
existence which are too weak for his destined, purely spiritual existence, then even though these weaker aspects were
provided for his salvation, they may become hindrances.
In order for God's provision for the salvation of man to be
effective, man must understand that eventually the body must
be abandoned.
Finally,

we turn to the soteriological aspect of

Origen's incarnational theology.

Throughout his interpreta-

tions of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9, Origen emphasizes that
the ultimate solution to man's current, fallen condition is
the re-establishment of the soul's original similarity to
the Logos.

This original similarity existed between the

Logos and pure spirits.

Pure spirits were related to God
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the Father in a way which was similar to the relationship of
the Logos and God the Father.

The salvation of man depends

on the recovery of this relationship with God the Father,
which is the essence of man's original similarity to the
Logos.
But man's soul cannot simply return to this relationship;

the soul cannot simply retrace its steps and be-

come like the Logos again.

Through its original fall,

soul has forgotten most of its true nature.

the

Its union with

the body can make the soul even more oblivious to its true
spiritual existence.

Since the embodied soul cannot make

itself like the Logos,
embodied soul.

the Logos makes himself like the

The Word becomes flesh and dwells among

embodied souls.
When the Logos becomes incarnate,
new similarity between himself and the soul.

he institutes a
This similar-

ity consists of the fact that both the soul and the Logos
share a corporeal aspect of existence.

This new similarity

is inferior to the original similarity of pure spirits to
the unincarnate Logos since the flesh is inferior to the
spirit.
But when the Logos assumes a corporeal existence, he
transforms that existence into spirituality.

Thus,

the

Logos reveals to the embodied soul the spirituality of the
soul's true existence.
of Jesus Christ,

By contemplating the divine nature

the incarnate Logos,

the soul becomes in-
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creasingly aware of its true nature,
according to that nature.

and is able to live

The "weaker" similarity between

the incarnate Logos and the embodied soul leads to the recovery of the original similarity between the unincarnate
Logos and pure spirits.
The ''bodily" meaning of Scripture must be left behind in favor of the spiritual meaning;

but the weakest

aspect of Scripture communicates this spiritual meaning.
The soul which becomes a pure spirit must lose its corporeal
aspect; but the body is the means by which a soul may become
a pure spirit again.

The similarity between the embodied

soul and the incarnate Logos will be superceded by the original similarity between the pure spirit and the unincarnate Logos;

but this original similarity cannot be recov-

ered unless the Incarnation of the Logos establishes the
new, corporeal similarity.

As Danielou points out, Origen's

attitude toward all these aspects of man's current existence
is the same.
Origen believes the salvation of man consists of the
recovery of a purely spiritual existence:

a relationship

with God the Father modeled after the relationship of the
Logos to the Father.

Man's corporeal existence cannot share

in this higher existence;
behind.

it is too weak and must be left

But Origen's theological anthropology declares that

God uses the weak things of this world to redeem and reestablish the strong.
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Another opinion is
set forth in Lilla, Clement, pp. 108-109.
27.

Prine. I,2,6.

See chapter 2 of this thesis.

28.

See also Q. Gen. 2.62.

29. Of course, this need not mean that this argument
is Philo's own work. Philo draws upon a body of traditional interpretations, and this may be one of the
elements which he adopts from this tradition. But the
similarity between Origen's argument and Philo's makes
it likely that Origen uses Philo as his source in this
case.
30.

L.A. 1.31-38.

31.

L.A. 1.31-32; QE...:._ 134.

32.

L.A. 1.34-35, 38.

33.

See chapter 2 of this thesis.

34.

See especially QE..:_ 134-135; L.A. 1.32,40.

35.

Jo. 2.3.

36.

L.A.!... 1.32.

37.
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39.

L.A. 1.31; Det. 83-84.

40.

Cels. VI,63.

41. Thomas H. Tobin, S.J. The Creation of Man: Philo
and the History of Interpretation.
(Washington:
Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1983),
pp. 28-9.
42. ~ 1.46-48; L.A. 1.31-32; Q. Gen. 1.4.
Tobin, Creation of Man, pp. 23-28.
43.
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Prologue to Cant., pp. 220-221.

44. This is Clement's opinion (see the first section
of this chapter).
Origen may be implicitly correcting
Clement.
45. Trigg,
thesis.
46.

Origen,

See chapter 2 of this

Tobin, Creation of Man, p. 87.

47. L.A. 1.31-32,40.
4.23-24; ~ 139.
48.

p. 203.

See also Det. 83-84 and

Spec~

See chapter 2 of this thesis.

49. Philo does distinguish between man as he exists
currently and the first man, the earthly man of Gen
2:6-7:
this man was superior in body and soul, compared to man as he presently exists.
But Philo nevertheless sees this superior first man as the origin
of the species of man as he currently exists.
50. Cf. especially Q. Gen.
Spec. 1.81, 3.207.

1.8,21;

Dec. 134;

51.

Tobin, Creation of Man, pp. 34, 141-144.

52.

L.A. 1.53, 88-89.

53.
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Prine. !!!,6,3; Trigg, Origen, p. 108.

2.

Trigg, Origen, p. 107.

3.
Prine. III,6,1.
But see also Bigg,
ists, pp. 240-241, and footnote 17.

Christian Platon-

4.
Except, as we shall see later, Christ's "soul"-the
spirit which is to become Christ's soul.
(Prine. III,6,3)
Only the Latin translation of this work survives.
This
translation refers to Christ's soul as "clinging to God from
the beginning of creation"--but the original spiritual creation is clearly meant, so the term "soul" actually refers to
the spirit.
5.

Trigg, Origen, p. 104.

6.

Bigg, Christian Platonists, pp. 240-241.

7.
Maloney, Man, p. 72. Sometimes Origen implies that the
spirit exists in the soul as a memory or an "instinct"--a
"spirit-sense." Hom. in Ezech. XIII,4.
8.

Hom. in Gen. !,17.

9.

Trigg, Origen, pp. 106-107.

10.

Hom. in Gen. !,16.

11.

Hom. in Gen. !,13; XIII,4.

12.

Maloney, Man, pp. 74-75.

13.

But see Bigg, Christian Platonists, p. 247.

14.

Ibid., p. 273.

15. This statement is based on Prine. III,6,1. As a Christian, Origen believes in the resurrection of the body.
Therefore he qualifies his conviction concerning the incorporeality of spirits with a discussion of "airy bodies."
(See Trigg, Origen, pp. 112-114)
The issue of whether or
not Origen departs from orthodox Christianity in his concept
of the resurrection of the body is not directly relevant to
this thesis.
For our purposes, we can simply state that in
this context, "corporeal nature" means a material body with
carnal desires and defects, which is thus subject to corruption. Pure spirits cannot have this kind of body.
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Danielou, Origen, p. 295; Maloney, Man, p. 13.

17.
Maloney, Man, p. 75. We saw in chapter 3 of this thesis that Origen assumes the rationality of man's spirit,
which is the divine aspect which remains in man's current
existence.
This assumption makes it natural for Origen to
describe the return to man's original spiritual state in
terms of contemplation and knowledge.
18.

Danielou, Origen, p. 295.

19.

Maloney,

20.

See chapter 3 of this thesis.

~an,

pp. 75-76.

21.
Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, p. 128; Grillmeier,
Christ in the Christian Tradition, p. 142; Danielou, Origen,
p. 257.
22.
This is opposed to Danielou's position.
Origen, p. 261.

Danielou,

23.
Trigg, Origen, pp. 14-15.
The theological reasons for
Origen's interpretations described by Trigg are not the same
as those which are argued here, because Trigg is not primarily concerned with Origen's exegesis of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen
2:4-9.
24.

Cels~

IV,3; VI,63.

See chapter 2 of this thesis.

25.
This theme also appears in Contra Celsum, in the context of Origen's Euhemerism argument.
The "deification"
Origen discusses does not only apply to Jesus Christ, but to
Christians as well. Cf. Gamble, "Euhemerism."
26.

Maloney, Man, pp. 74-75.

27.
A discussion of Origen's Trinitarian theology is, of
course, relevant to his incarnational theology--especially
in regard to the Logos theology which Origen assumes in his
discussion of the Incarnation.
However, a complete discussion of Origen's understanding of the relationship between
God the Father and the Logos is beyond the scope of this
thesis.
The problems inherent in Origen's understanding of
the relationship are well described by Trigg, Origen,
pp. 14-15 and Danielou, q~!gen, pp. 261-295. See Lyons, The
Cosmic Christ, pp. 106-136 for a discussion of Origen's
concept of the relationship of God the Father and the Logos
which fits in well with this thesis.
28.
Hom. in Gen. XIII,4.
See chapter 3 of this thesis for
how Philo has influenced this interpretation.
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29.
Prine. III,3,7.
This passage is somewhat obscure, but
it seems to point to this kind of intimate similarity
between the Logos and pure spirits.
See also Lyons, The
Cosmic Christ, pp. 111-115,127 and Danielou, Origen,
pp. 254-255.
30.
Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, p. 128; Lyons, The
Cosmic Christ, p. 137; and Danielou, Origen, p. 261.
Danielou thinks this is where Origen deviates from the
orthodox Christian position.
As we shall see later, Origen
does stress the difference between the Logos and created
spirits as well as the similarity between them.
31.

Trigg, Origen, p. 104 and Danielou, Origen, p. 257.

32. Joseph F. Mitros, "Patristic Views of Christ's Salvific
Work."
Thought, 42 (1967), 421; Maloney, Man, pp. 68-69;
and Gamble, "Euhemerism," p. 24.
33.
Gustaf Aulen, Christus Victor: An Historical Study of
the Three Main Types of the Idea of Atonement. (New York:
Macmillan, 1969), p. 38; Danielou, Origen, p. 251.
34.
Grillmeier, Christ in the Christian Tradition, p. 142;
Danielou, Origen, p. 258.
35.

Danielou, Origen, pp. 259-272.

36.
But see Grillmeier, Christ in the Christian Tradition,
p. 133; Danielou, Origen, p. 265.
Several authors state
that the Incarnation is important to Origen's soteriology,
but stress other aspects as being much more important.
37.
Grillmeier, Christ in the Christian Tradition, pp. 52,
143-145; Danielou, Q~en, pp. 262-263; Lyons, The Cosmic
Christ, p. 137.
38.

Hom. in Gen. I,13.

39.

Cels~

See chapter 2 of this thesis.

III,41.

40.
The need for the soul to be united to a body follows
this same pattern.
After the spirit becomes a soul, it is
no longer able to simply reassert its spiritual nature. The
soul cannot directly comprehend its true spiritual existence
directly.
It must be taught about the spiritual realm
through something which it can comprehend.
The soul can
comprehend the body, so God unites the soul with a body in a
material world which is similar to the spiritual realm.
Thus, the soul can learn about pure, spiritual existence
through the body.
This is the assumption behind Origen's
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exegesis of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9 in his Prologue to the
Commentary on the Song of Songs. See Trigg, Origen, p. 203
and chapter 2 of this thesis.
41.

Grillmeier, Christ in the Christian Tradition, p. 148.

42.
Some authors think that the body is the reason why
Origen cannot do without the ''middle term," the spirit which
unites with the Logos. They assert that Origen, as a Middle
Platonist, could not conceive of God as assuming bodily
form. (E.g., Gamble, "Euhemerism," pp. 28-29) This position
misunderstands Origen's theological anthropology.
Man's
problem is not that he is an embodied soul; man's problem is
that he is a soul at all.
43.
Prine. II, 6, 5-6.
See also Wolfson, Philosoi?hy,
pp. 392-394; Grillmeier, Christ in the Christian Tradition,
p. 146; and Trigg, Origen, p. 107.
44.

Cels. III,41.

45.

Trigg, Origen, p. 107.

46.

E.g., Cels. III,41.

47.
This understanding of Origen opposes Danielou's
position. (Origen, pp. 261,296)
The problem with Origen's
Logos theology is not that he makes the Logos too much like
pure spirits. Origen's insistence on the difference between
them actually weakens his incarnational theology.
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